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ENVffiONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 
CARL TOBIAS* 
The 1983 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 has 
been the most controversial revision in the half-century history of 
the Federal Rules. Judges have applied amended Rule 11, which 
requires them to sanction lawyers and parties who do not conduct 
reasonable inquiries before filing papers, in over 1000 reported 
opinions, considerably more unreported determinations, and numer-
ous informal contexts.1 The Rule has engendered much unnecessary 
satellite litigation and has been implemente4 inconsistently, while 
attorneys' fees remain the "sanction of choice" for violations.2 Rule 
11 activity has especially disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs and 
lawyers, whose lack of resources can make them risk averse. The 
judiciary has sanctioned civil rights plaintiffs more than any other 
category of civil litigant; in numerous districts, they were nearly 
three times more likely to be sanctioned than other litigants.3 
Considerable evidence suggests that these developments have chilled 
the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys.4 
Some observers of the Rule's implementation have wondered 
whether this detrimental Rule 11 activity occurs in other forms of 
public law litigation, such as environmental cases or products lia-
bility actions, or extends across the law. When soliciting public 
comment on the provision's revision, the Judicial Conference Ad-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. B.A., Duke University, 1968; 
LL.B., University of Virginia, 1972. I wish to thank Tom France, Peggy Hesse, Scott 
Mitchell, Peggy Sanner, and Jack Tuholske for valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and 
Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece; and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing 
support. Any errors that remain are mine alone. 
1. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE ll OF THE FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES, reprinted in 131 F .R.D. 335, 344 (1990) [hereinafter 
CALL FOR COMMENTS]. For a discussion of the 19~ amendment and its effects, see infra 
notes 11·20 and accompanying text. 
2. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PRoCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE, reprinted in 137 F .R.D. 
53 (1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT]; Attachment to letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, 
Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1-2 (1991). 
3. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, FINAL REPORT ON RULE 11, s lC, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter 
FINAL REPORT]; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F .R.D. 189, 234-41 
(1988). 
4. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 Vn.L. L. REV. 105, 
107-09 (1991); Vairo, supra note 3, at 200-01. 
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visory Committee on the Civil Rules recently inquired whether Rule 
11 has "been administered unfairly to any particular group of 
lawyers or parties."5 The Advisory Committee also asked whether 
Rule 11 has adversely affected attorneys or litigants with limited 
resources, even if judges have been applying the Rule "with un-
exceptionable even-handedness."6 Indeed, Professor Melissa Nelken, 
in a 1990 study of Rule 11, determined that the provision's damp-
ening "effect on lawyers' willingness to seek changes in the law is 
not limited to certain types of practice, but is widespread, a finding 
that has important implications for future developments in all areas 
of law.''7 
Evaluators have analyzed very little formal, and virtually no 
informal,8 Rule 11 activity in public law litigation apart from civil 
rights cases. Because environmental lawsuits are a paradigmatic 
type of public law litigation that contributes substantially to envi-
ronmental protection and to the development of public law in other 
fields, it is important to scrutinize Rule 11 activity in environmental 
cases. This Article undertakes that effort and is one of the first 
attempts to study informal Rule 11 activity. 
Part I of this Article briefly describes the developments that led 
to the significant amendment of Rule 11 during 1983 and explains 
what the revised Rule requires of attorneys, parties, and the federal 
judiciary. The second Part evaluates the provision's implementation 
in environmental litigation since August 1983. This examination 
finds a low incidence of formal Rule 11 activity in environmental 
cases and shows that the few courts that have formally applied the 
Rule were solicitous of the needs of plaintiffs. Indeed, the study 
reveals striking discontinuities between environmental lawsuits and 
civil rights actions. Most important, judges have issued only four-
5. CALL FOR COMMENTS, su:pra note 1, 131 F .R.D. at 347. 
6. See id. In August, 1991, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules proposed that Rule 11 be amended. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at xv, 137 
F .R.D. at 63. The proposal remains nascent, is likely to be modified substantially, and, even 
if left unchanged, would become effective in December, 1993, at the earliest. Moreover, the 
focus of this Article is the implications of Rule 11 for federal court legal culture, not the 
particulars of the current Rule or the proposal. The proposal, therefore, is not comprehen· 
sively analyzed here, although it is mentioned when relevant to issues that are treated. 
See generally Carl Tobias, Reronsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). 
7. Melissa L. Nelken, TM Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the 
Nortlurrn District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147, 152 (19901. 
8. Formal Rule 11 activity involves invocation of the Rule that leads to published opinions, 
while informal activity is more subtle, typically involving hints or threats to use the Rule. 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 431 
teen published opinions in environmental cases9 which contrasts 
markedly with the approximately 500 published decisions in civil 
rights suits.10 
Because assessors have evaluated a small amount of informal 
Rule 11 activity and because informal activity has seriously disad-
vantaged civil rights plaintiffs, this Article analyzes informal Rule 
11 activity. The study indicates that judges and environmental 
defendants have invoked the provision somewhat more frequently 
in informal, than in formal, situations but that environmental plain-
tiffs have been disadvantaged substantially less than civil rights 
plaintiffs. Moreover, this Rule 11 activity bas neither dissuaded 
potential litigants from initiating environmental suits nor prevented 
parties who filed cases from vigorously pursuing the actions. 
Part III of this Article affords explanations for these findings, 
particularly the dearth of Rule 11 activity, and explores how that 
paucity informs understanding of the contemporary legal culture in 
the federal courts. The segment specifically examines the perspec-
tives on environmental litigation of judges, attorneys, and parties 
who actively participate in such litigation. By refracting Rule 11 
through the prism of environmental lawsuits and comparing that 
experience with Rule 11 activity in civil rights cases, the study 
enhances comprehension of modern civil litigation. 
I. 1983 AMENDMENT OF RULE 11 
The considerations that prompted the Supreme Court and Con- · 
gress to revise Rule 11-which was one of the original Federal 
Rules promulgated in 1938 and had remained unchanged until 
1983-warrant only cursory examination here, as they have been 
competently chronicled elsewbere.11 The reluctance of lawyers to 
9. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
10. This is a conservative estimate that is premised on several considerations. I began 
with Professor Vairo's claim that the federal courts issued 191 reported Rule 11 opinions 
involving civil rights between the August 1983 effective date of the amendment and 
December 15, 1987. See id. I then extrapolated from that figure for reported opinions-
widely considered to be the "tip of the iceberg"-to published opinions that judges have 
issued since August 1983. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSmON THE REPORT OF 
THE THIRD CmCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 56 n.205, 56-
59 (1989). Elizabeth Wiggins and Thomas Willging, who had substantial responsibility for 
producing the Final Report, supa note 3, have estimated that "one to ten percent of the 
judiciary's application of the Rule to sanctions motions appears in reported determinations." 
Tobias, supa note 6, at 9 n.52. 
11. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformat:ion of American Ci'llil Procedure: The 
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invoke the Rule and of courts to impose sanctions led to its disuse.12 
During the mid-1970's, however, numerous judges, including Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, and some writers began to perceive that 
the federal· courts were experiencing a "litigation explosion."13 They 
suggested that lawyers and parties were filing a growing number 
of civil lawsuits, too few of which had merit.14 The judges and 
commentators asserted that the Federal Rules, especially by pr~ 
viding for flexible pleading and open~nded discovery, permitted 
attorneys and parties to misuse, overuse, and abuse the litigation 
process.15 
Notwithstanding the controversial character of these propositions 
and the lack of data underlying the concepts,16 the Advisory Com-
mittee and the Supreme Court proposed that Rules 11, 16, and 26 
be fundamentally modified as one response to the difficulties per-
ceived.17 Congress did not reject the recommendations, and the 
amendments became effective in August, 1983.18 
Revised Rule 11 imposes substantially greater responsibilities on 
lawyers and litigants and increases judicial control over civil law-
Example of Ride 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-29 (1989); Melissa L. Nelken, Sancti<ms 
Under Amended Federal, Ride 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Com-
pensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1314-17 (1986). See generally D. Michael 
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal, 
Ru!.e of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (1976) (discussing pre-1976 history of 
Rule 11). 
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F .R.D. 165, 198-201 
(1983). See generally ARTHUR MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 
12-15 (1984); Risinger, supra note 11, at 34-37. 
13. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Warren 
E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need For Systematic Anticipatiqn. in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 CA. Leo Levin & Russell R. 
Wheeler eds., 1979). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Jwi.ges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 
(1982) (questioning judicial management techniques as a means to control increasing case-
loads); Carl Tobias, Puhlic Law Litigation and the Federal, Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989) (discussing increasing civil caseloads and attendant 
abuse). 
14. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979). See generally Thomas 
B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987) (discussing 
continuing rise of civil lawsuits in the 1980's). 
15. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) 
(per curiam): Richard L. Marcus, The Revival, of Fact Pleading Under the Federal, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary 
System: Dinosaur or Phoen:i..x, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984). 
16. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 10; Burbank, supra note 11, at 1927-28; Maurice 
Rosenberg, Federal, Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2197, 2198-202 (1989). 
17. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 2203. 
18. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See 
generally MILLER, supra note 12. 
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suits. It requires that practitioners and parties perform reasonable 
factual investigations and legal inquiries before filing papers while 
commanding that courts sanction them for not doing so.19 The 
Advisory Committee Note that accompanies the Rule also admon-
ishes federal judges that Rule 11 is "not intended to chill an 
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal 
theories."20 
Il. RULE 11 ACTIVITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
A. A Word About Method.ology 
"Environmental litigation," as used in this Article, comprises civil 
lawsuits that involve some "institutional" litigant, such as the gov-
ernment, or a public interest organization, such as the Sierra Club, 
and are filed under federal pollution control, public lands, or natural 
resource protection and preservation legislation, such as the Clean 
Water Act or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).21 It 
19. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer 
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose • • • • If a pleading, motion, 
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to 
pay ·to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
Numerous courts deemphasize the reasonableness of inquiries that preceded the filing of 
papers (conduct) and stress the merits of the litigation or the quality of the papers submitted 
(product). See, e.g., Davis v. Carl, 906 F .2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that "creative 
claims, coupled even with ambiguous or inconsequential facts, may merit dismissal but not 
punishment"); Romero v. City of Pomona, ~ F .2d 1418, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing 
frivolousness of claims). But see Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1500-01 
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (emphasizing conduct over product). The courtS that emphasize product 
typically speak of "frivolous" papers. I have followed that practice here as shorthand to 
describe a paper that is not "well grounded in fact" nor "warranted legally," although I 
have criticized the product approach. See Carl Tobias, Certijicati-On and Civil Rights, 136 
F.R.D. 223, 226 nn.20-21 (1991). See generally Burbank, supra note 11, at 1933-34, 1941-42 
(discussing conduct and product approaches and proposing that judges look to prefiling 
conduct as a way of achieving uniformity in Rule 11 determinations). 
20. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983). 
21. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(1988); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35 (1988); cf. NAN ARON, 
LmERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PuBLIC lNTEREsT LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989) 
(analyzing public interest litigants as institutional litigants); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT (1983) (discussing government as institutional litigant). 
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includes, therefore, civil cases that the government pursues to 
secure compliance with applicable statutes. 
Although environmental litigation could encompass suits that 
litigants bring under common law theories, such as nuisance or 
trespass, which typically involve private parties and private prop-
erty, these cases are not included because they experienced prac-
tically no formal Rule 11 activity.22 I also exclude litigation seeking 
to allocate responsibility for the disposal and cleanup of hazardous 
or toxic substances between private entities, principally corpora-
tions and insurers, primarily pursuant to legislation such as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).23 Those suits should not be characterized as 
"public law litigation," even though the potential for cleaning up 
the wastes certainly implicates "public interests."24 
B. Formal Rule 11 Activity in Environmental Litigation 
1. Data 
The most important aspects of Rule ll's implementation in 
environmental litigation since its August 1983 effective date are 
the dearth of formal Rule 11 activity and the solicitude that 
federal judges have exhibited for the needs of environmental 
plaintiffs when formally enforcing the provision.25 These consid-
22. The closest analogy that I found was litigation pursued by homeowners' associations. 
See, e.g., Westlake N. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F.2d 1301 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that although the district court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions, the 
actions of the homeowners' association were not so frivolous as to warrant Rule 11 sanctionsh 
Collin County v. H.A.V .E.N., 654 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (ruiing that Rule 11 
enforcement is a "method for preventing meritless suits against public officials" but that 
in the instant case the homeowners' association would be given an extension to file an 
amended counterclaim): see also Petit v. County of Essex, No. 91-CV-404, 1991 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9942, at *S.14 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 1991) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions on landowners' 
attorney for frivolous complaint seeking declaratory judgment to halt landfill construction); 
Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 192-94 (N.D. III. 1990) (imposing Rule 
11 sanctions against developer's attorney for frivolous action against homeowners): cf. Boone 
v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 1367, 1378 (D. Haw. 1990) <ruling that government counsel's 
motion to amend or alter judgment for owner of artificial lagoon in suit to secure owner's 
right to deny public access was insufficiently egregious to warrant sanctions). 
23. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
24. For discussion of "public interest litigation," see Tobias, supra note 13, at 282-83: cf. 
GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, THE PuBLIC INTEREST (1960) (discussing the public interest): Ernest 
Gellborn, Puhlic Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972) 
(same). Although hazardous and toxic substances litigation is excluded from the data 
compilation, some of the cases are employed for illustrative purposes. See, e.g., infra notes 
57, 67 and accompanying text. 
25. Their lack of resources can make public interest litigants and environmental plaintiffs 
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erations contrast markedly with Rule 11 activity in civil rights 
litigation. Since August 1983, federal courts have rendered four-
teen pUblished opinions applying Rule 11 in environmental law-
suits, while the federal judiciary issued 191 reported Rule 11 
decisions involving civil rights between that date and December 
15, 1987, alone.26 
District judges found that environmental plaintiffs contravened 
the Rule in five cases, but appellate courts reversed two of these 
determinations.27 One trial judge decided that an environmental 
defendant apparently had contravened Rule 11.28 Even when 
courts held that environmental litigants had violated the provi-
sion, no parties suffered substantial monetary sanctions.29 
risk averse. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights LitigatUm, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 495-
98 (1988-89) {discussing these concepts in civil rights litigation). I recognize that all of these 
litigants may not suffer resource deficiencies. Indeed, some environmental public interest 
litigants, such as the National Wildlife Federation, have several million members and 
comparatively large annual budgets. "Environmental plaintiffs" are public interest litigants, 
or other litigants, such as the government, that purport to represent the public interest. 
See ARON, supra note 21, at 3-4. They do not include entities that represent regulated 
interests. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity fOT AU, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1465-68, 1544 (1984) 
{questioning whether business-sponsored public interest law firms are truly "public interest" 
or charitable for tax purposes). 
26. This Article analyzes or cites 12 of the environmental cases. The other two cases, 
which seem insufficiently important to warrant treatment, are Polger v. Republic National 
Bank, 709 F. Supp. 204 CD. Colo. 1989) and United States v. Alexander, No. G-86-267, 1988 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307 {S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1988). See also United States v. Alexander, 771 
F. Supp. 830 {S.D. Tex. 1991) (discussing subsequent Rule 11 developments); Vairo, supra 
note 3, at 200 {describing study that located 191 reported civil rights cases). "Published" 
opinions are those available on computerized reporting systems; "reported" opinions are 
those published in the federal reporter system. 
27. See Westlake N. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F .2d 1301, 
1302 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 
Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 266 {1st Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Beatrice 
Foods Co., 900 F .2d 388, 395-96 (1st Cir. 1990); cf. Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 808 
F .2d 285, 286, 291 (3d Cir. 1986) {reversing trial court's $165,000 attorney fee award under 
pre-1983 version of Rule 11 to defendant benzene manufacturers); Atlantic States Legal 
Found., Inc. v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 87-39E {W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 1988) {unpublished 
opinion imposing $5000 sanction on environmental plaintiff whose attorneys alleged "current 
and continuing" violations of the Clean Water Act even though defendants' plant had closed 
four months before). 
28. See United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 {W .D. Mich. 1989) 
{implying a violation by environmental defendant occurred, but delaying decision until 
defendant had been heard on the issue). This is one of the few cases in which environmental 
plaintiffs sought sanctions. See also Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 
192-94 {N.D. Ill. 1990) (granting plaintiff homeowners' motion for sanctions against developer). 
29. See, e.g., Westlake, 915 F .2d at 1302 {reversing sanction order); Strimgfellow, 911 F .2d 
at 226 (no sanction ordered); Purs7nw, 907 F .2d at 266 (joint sanction of $250 imposed upon 
two attorneys); Anderson, 900 F .2d at 395 <Rule 11 violation by plaintiff and Rule 37 violation 
by defendant offset each other, no monetary sanction imposed); City of Menominee, 727 F. 
Supp. at 1118 (no sanction ordered); Avte:t; Fibers, slip op. at 5 ($5000 sanction imposed on 
environmental plaintiff). 
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2. Case Law 
a. Judicial Application Solicitous of Environmental 
Plaintiffs 
(1). Rule 11 Violations 
Few of the federal judges who considered sanctioning environ-
mental plaintiffs found that the litigants contravened Rule 11. 
Courts have determined that only a minuscule number of envi-
ronmental plaintiffs failed to perform reasonable prefiling inves-
tigations of the facts or had filed papers that were not factually 
well grounded.3o 
The judges seemed to appreciate that factual issues are undis-
puted or are of limited consequence in some environmental cases. 
The courts appeared to comprehend that, in numerous other 
lawsuits involving contested facts, plaintiffs had assembled and 
assessed pertinent data or that the parties lacked access to, or 
resources for collecting, complex information relevant to Rule 11 
compliance. 
For example, in complicated water pollution litigation, one 
district court rejected the defendant's argument that most of the 
"allegations in plaintiffs' complaint [were] 'not well grounded in 
fact.' "31 The judge found that the "issues and allegations con-
cerned in this case are very complex, and that there is no showing 
of bad faith or failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry by plain-
tiffs."32 
Courts also have been reluctant to conclude that environmental 
plaintiffs neglected to undertake reasonable prefiling inquiries 
into the law or submitted papers that were not warranted by 
existing law or by good faith arguments for the extension, mod-
ification, or reversal of that law. Some judges apparently believed 
or understood that environmental litigation involves complicated 
issues of law and complex legal theories and that environmental 
law is a dynamic, evolving field, primarily because of the massive, 
convoluted statutory schemes that underlie many environmental 
suits.33 
30. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. 
31. See Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Unified Sewerage Agency, Civ. No. 88-1128-FR, 
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8311, at *33 (D. Or. July 7, 1989). 
32. Id. at *33-34. 
33. Many judges, members of Congress, and commentators agree that CERCLA and the 
Clean Air and Clean Water legislation are complex. Indeed, the 1990 amendments to the 
air legislation are several hundred pages long. Cf. Vairo, supra note 3, at 202 (making 
assertions similar to those in text regarding Rule ll's application in securities/Racketeering 
Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO)/trade regulation cases). 
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Illustrative are two recent Ninth Circuit opinions in which the 
court found that the trial courts had abused their discretion in 
holding that environmental plaintiffs were asserting frivolous 
legal theories.34 The circuit court reversals are telling because 
the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review, which the 
Supreme Court articulated last year for all Rule 11 determina-
tions, is extremely deferential.35 
In one of these cases, the Ninth Circuit first observed that an 
attorney's failure to inform the judge pf pertinent statutory or 
case authority would not alone support the imposition of sanc-
tions.36 The panel characterized certain case law interpreting 
CERCLA that the plaintiff did not cite as "relevant but distin-
guishable" and remarked that even the holding of a district court 
in the Northern District of Illinois that was directly on point 
would not make the plaintiffs motion to a trial judge in the 
Ninth Circuit frivolous.37 The appellate court generously read the 
ambiguous provision of the complicated CERCLA legislation at 
issue and employed the lenient standard of whether the disputed 
statutory terminology "plausibly supported" the plaintiffs legal 
contention.38 
A different panel of the court applied an equally flexible 
standard, asking whether "at least an arguable question" existed 
as to the complex legal issue of whether local residents are 
"bound as privies to judgments" entered in environmental liti-
gation against municipalities in which they live.39 The Ninth 
Circuit invoked recent Supreme Court precedent that "cast doubt 
on whether non-party suits were to be treated as impermissible 
collateral attacks on previous federal court judgments" and con-
cluded that plaintiffs could make a reasonable, good faith argu-
ment for their legal position.40 
34. See Westlake N. Property Owners' Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F .2d 1301, 
1307 (9th Cir. 1990): United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F .2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1990). 
35. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990) (specifying that a 
district court abuses its discretion if its Rule 11 determination is based on an erroneous 
view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence). 
36. See Stri:ngfellaw, 911 F .2d at 226. 
37. See id. at 227: see also Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. 
Supp. 651 (N.D. ID. 1988) (underlying case that plaintiff in Stringfell<Yw failed to cite). 
38. See Stringfell<Yw, 911 F.2d at 226-27; see also United States v. Environmental Waste 
Control, Inc., No. S87-55 !RLMl, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,710, at *41 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 
1991) (holding that a novel, yet rational, approach to a complex motion for proceedings 
supplemental is not sanctionable). 
39. Westlake N. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, 915 F .2d 1301, 1307 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
40. Id. (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989)). Congress modified WiUcs in the Civil 
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Some courts closely scrutinized the Rule 11 motions filed against 
environmental plaintiffs. One district judge characterized a de-
fendant's request for sanctions as frivolous and refused to "waste 
the court's time addressing it."41 A second trial judge denied a 
motion by defense counsel, remarking that the provision should 
be reserved for exceptional circumstances.42 
A district court's determination in another case demonstrates 
how unwilling some judges have been to find that environmental 
plaintiffs contravened Rule 11. The trial court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' complaint, although the judge observed that the plain-
tiffs had failed to show that their opponents "violated a single 
law" and stated that one of the plaintiffs' claims was "difficult 
at best to grasp, and once understood borders precariously on 
frivolity."43 The court rejected the defendant's motion for sanc-
tions and granted the plaintiffs leave to replead but issued stern 
warnings that their pleadings had "already evinced unacceptable 
carelessness," that any revised papers would be evaluated 
"through Rule 11-colored glasses," and that "one method for pre-
venting meritless suits against public officials is rigid enforce-
ment of Rule 11."44 
One district court implied that the request of an environmental 
plaintiff for the judge to impose Rule 11 sanctions against a 
corporate defendant was justified.45 The judge found that the 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 108. See generally Susan S. 
Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legisl,ative Respanse, 1991 U. !LL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 1991) (examining Wilks and Congress' 1990 effort to enact § 6 of the 
1990 Civil Rights Act, which would have barred collateral challenges to consent decrees); 
George M. Strickler, Jr., Martin v. Wilks, 64 TUI.. L. REV. 1557 (1990). 
41. Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. P .D. Oil & Chem. Storage, 627 F. Supp. 
1074, 1085 (D.N.J. 1986). 
42. International Union, UAW v. Amerace Corp., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353, 1358-
59 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Environmental Waste Cantrol, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,710, at 
*42 (plaintiff's motion failed to evidence the total disregard of existing law that warrants 
sanctions). See generally infra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing federal agencies' 
invocation of Rule 11 only in exceptional circumstances). 
43. Collin County v. H.A.V .E.N., 654 F. Supp. 943, 952-53 (N.D. Tex. 1987). The "plaintiff' 
homeowners' association actually was a "counterplaintiff." See UL at 945. 
44. See UL at 954. Several additional judges, sua sponte, have cautioned environmental 
parties to be alert to the possible future application of Rule 11. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. v. United States, 15 CI. Ct. 381, 398 (1988) (stating that Rule 11 would be the appropriate 
remedy if plaintiffs criticisms of defendant's arguments in opposition to a takings claim 
based on the denial of a wetlands fill permit were well grounded); Corren v. New York 
Univ. No •. 86 Civ. 7199 (CSH), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,456, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1987) 
(cautioning that if a plaintiff repleads seeking federal question jurisdiction under the Clean 
Air Act for his wrongful termination claim, he and counsel should keep Rule 11 in mind). 
45. See United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W .D. Mich. 1989). 
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company's behavior "was not warranted by existing Eleventh 
Amendment law" and that its reply brief included no "argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of the governing 
authorities cited by the court."46 
(2). Imposition of Mandatory Sanctions 
Those few judges who determined that environmental plaintiffs 
had contravened Rule 11 appeared solicitous of the litigants' 
needs when effectuating the mandatory duty to levy appropriate 
sanctions.47 The courts seemed to recognize, for instance, that 
significant resource disparities can exist between many environ-
mental plaintiffs and their adversaries and that the imposition 
of large financial assessments can chill the plaintiffs' enthusiasm.48 
The judges apparently have attempted to levy the "least severe 
sanction neces~ary" or to tailor sanctions to Rule ll's primary 
purpose of deterrence, and courts have employed nonmonetary 
alternatives or have consulted numerous equitable factors, such 
as the ability of violators to pay, in imposing financial sanctions.49 
No judge has held an environmental plaintiff responsible for the 
attorneys' fees that its opponents incurred. 
Two recent First Circuit cases are illustrative. In Maine Au-
dubon Society v. Purslow/'° the First Circuit sustained the district 
court ruling which ordered that two attorneys for the Maine 
Audubon Society who were "respected members of the Maine 
bar jointly pay a small monetary sanction ($250.00)" for violating 
Rule 11.51 
The "plaintiff' was a state governmental agency. The court delayed a final decision on 
sanctions because the defendant had a right to be heard on the issue and to raise any 
pertinent defense. See also Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 192-93 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (involving a private property dispute in which the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions 
on a plaintiff developer at the instigation of the individual landowner defendants}. 
46. City of Menominee, 72:1 F. Supp. at 1118. 
47. Rule 11 requires that judges impose appropriate sanctions which may encompass 
reasonable expenses such as attorneys' fees. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, supra note 19. 
48. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
49. The courts deciding environmental cases do not specifically state what is said in the 
text, although judges treating sanctions in civil rights cases have. See, e.g., Doering v. 
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F .2d 191, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving 
equitable factors and nonmonetary alternatives); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 
F .2d 866, 876-78 (5th Cir. 1988) (imposing least severe sanction and considering nonmonetary 
alternatives}; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1987) (tailoring sanctions 
to deterrence). 
50. 907 F .2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990). 
51. Id. at 266, afj'g No. 87-0297 CD. Me. Dec. 14, 1989) (order fixing sanctions). 
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In the second case, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods,52 the trial court 
determined that the decision of plaintiffs counsel to continue the 
prosecution of a claim, which the attorneys knew by the conclu-
sion of investigation and discovery lacked any factual basis, 
clearly contravened the Rule.53 Nonetheless, the trial judge de-
cided, and the First Circuit affirmed, that the magnitude of the 
sanction warranted by the plaintiffs Rule 11 violation approxi-
mated that attributable to defendant's contravention of Rule 37 
discovery requirements, so that the sanctions offset each other 
and should be imposed on neither party.54 
(3). Concern About Chilling Effects 
In considering whether environmental plaintiffs violated the 
Rule or in choosing appropriate sanctions when plaintiffs were 
in contravention, a small number of courts have expressed con-
cern about possible chilling effects.55 For instance, when the First 
Circuit upheld a small financial assessment that the trial court 
imposed on lawyers representing an environmental plaintiff, the 
appellate court observed that it had "no inclination to transform 
Rule 11 into a refrigeration device designed to chill reasonable 
creativity on counsel's part."56 District judges resolving several 
environmental cases involving corporations or insurers have sim-
ilarly warned that Rule 11 was not meant to discourage the 
zealous pursuit of legal or factual theories in developing fields 
of law, such as CERCLA.57 
52. 129 F .R.D. 394 ID. Mass. 1989). 
53. See id. at 403-04. 
54. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 129 F .R.D. 394, 403-04 (D. Mass. 1989); Anderson 
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F .2d 388, 395 (1st. Cir. 1990). 
55. This treatment mirrors the substantial concern evinced recently about Rule ll's 
chilling effects in civil rights cases. See, e.g .. Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F .2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); Davis v. Carl, 906 F .2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990h 
Jones v. Westside-Urban Health Ctr., 760 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (S.D. Ga. 1991); see also 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 110-16 (discussing recent federal appellate opinions solicitous of the 
needs of civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel). 
56. Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F .2d 265, 268; see also United States v. 
Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 131 B.R. 410, 426 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (stating that "(T]he 
application of Rule 11 to legal arguments requires a balance between the need to penalize 
those who pursue frivolous litigation and the danger of deterring litigants or attorneys 
from arguing for a change in the law"). 
57. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1989 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4194, at *17 (N.D. ill. Apr. 11, 1989); South Shore Bank v. Stewart Title 
Guar. Co., 688 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mass.), aff d mem., 867 F .2d 607 (1st Cir. 1988h New 
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 
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Plaintiffs 
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This solicitous formal judicial application of Rule 11 does not 
necessarily mean that the provision's enforcement was without 
difficulty for environmental plaintiffs and their counsel. Indeed, 
some courts have been or at least have seemed relatively unre-
sponsive to the needs of these parties and attorneys. 
Judges have found that environmental plaintiffs violated the 
Rule in several situations that can fairly be characterized as 
"close." The two First Circuit cases are illustrative.58 Different 
panels of the court sustained decisions of district judges in Maine 
and Massachusetts that environmental plaintiffs had violated Rule 
11, stating that litigants found in violation bear a "heavy burden 
of demonstrating that the trial judge was clearly not justified in 
entering [the] order."s9 
The panel that considered the determination of the Maine 
district court, even while irpposing this onerous requirement and 
applying the Supreme Court's new deferential standard of ap-
pellate review, described the case as close: "[W]e are left shy of 
a definite and firm conviction that a serious mistake was made."60 
The First Circuit upheld the trial judge's decision, observing that 
the "duty of oreasonable inquiry includes, as we see it, a duty of 
reasonable disclosure [of the relevant law]," especially when law-
yers proceed ex parte.61 The appellate panel ruled that the sixty 
day notice requirement of the Endangered Species Act,62 with 
which plaintiff argued it had substantially complied, must be 
strictly construed, thus rejecting plaintifrs legal theory .63 
58. See Purslow, 907 F .2d 265; Anderson., 900 F .2d 388. 
59. Purslow, 907 F .2d at 268 (quoting Anderson, 900 F .2d at 393 (citation omitted)); 
Anderson, 900 F .2d at 393 (quoting Spiller v. U.S.V. Labs., Inc., 842 F .2d 535, 537 (1st Cir. 
1988)). 
60. Purslow, 907 F .2d at 266, 269. 
61. Id. at 268-69. But see United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F .2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that failure to inform judge of pertinent authority would not alone support the 
imposition of sanctions). The attorney in Purslow was seeking a temporary restraining 
order, and the court recognized that time restraints may have hampered counsel. 
62. 16 u.s.c. SS 1531-1544 (1988). 
63. Purslow, 907 F.2d at 268; cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (holding 
that 60 day notice requirement of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's citizen suit 
provision is a mandatory condition precedent to commencing suit); Garcia v. Cecos Int'!, 
Inc., 761 F .2d 76, 78-82 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff must give actual notice of intent 
to sue at least 60 days before filing a complaint under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F .2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975) (enforcing a 
strict 60 day notice requirement), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976). 
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The other First Circuit panel affirmed the finding of the 
Massachusetts district judge that attorneys for environmental 
plaintiffs violated Rule 11 by pursuing certain claims after in-
vestigation and discovery had revealed that they lacked an ob-
jective basis in fact.64 The First Circuit stated that Rule 11 
imposes a continuing duty on parties and lawyers, although a 
substantial majority of the appellate courts addressing the issue 
have clearly rejected that interpretation.65 
When environmental plaintiffs contravene the Rule, some judges 
seem insufficiently appreciative of the litigants' needs in choosing 
proper sanctions. For instance, certain courts apparently have 
not tried to impose the least severe sanction, while other judges 
have failed to consider nonmonetary options or several important 
equitable factors, such as ability to pay or the gravity of the 
violation, in calculating the financial sanctions that they as-
sessed. 66 Moreover, a few courts have levied large awards in 
cases involving corporations and insurers.67 
Numerous judges have not mentioned in their opinions the 
potential for dampening the enthusiasm of environmental plain-
64. See Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F .2d 388, 393-96 (1st Cir. 1990), ajj'g 129 
F .R.D. 394, 403-04 (D. Mass. 1989). 
65. See id. at 393; cf. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. 
Ct. 922, 943 n.5 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (refusing to recognize continuing duty when 
issue not briefed). See Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F .2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that Rule 11 imposes no continuing dutyh Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F .2d 
938, 943 (11th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990); Thomas v. Capital Sec. 
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (same); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 
F .2d 1265, 1273-74 (2d Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987h Gaiardo v. Ethyl 
Corp., 835 F .2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). One panel of the Sixth Circuit, in Jackson v. 
Law Firm of O'Hara, Ruberg, Osborne & Taylor, 875 F .2d 1224, 1229 (6th Cir. 1989), cast 
doubt on the idea of a continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently articulated 
in Herron v. Jupiter Transportation Co., 858 F .2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
continuing duty exists). A similar situation obtains in the Fourth Circuit. One panel of the 
court, in Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F .2d 1363, 1382 (4th Cir. 1991), cast doubt on 
the idea of a continuing duty that another panel of the court apparently articulated in Blue 
v. United States Department of the Army, 914 F .2d 525, 544-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). See also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 2 (setting forth proposed 
Rule ll(b), which would impose a continuing duty). In a recent case finding that plaintiffs 
violated Rule 11, the plaintiffs' counsel apparently did not deserve much solicitude. See 
Petit v. County of Essex, No. 91·CV-404, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9942 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 
1991). 
66. Most of the cases discussed above did not specifically discuss what sanction might 
be the least severe or expressly consult equitable factors. See supra note 49 and accompa-
nying text. 
67. See, e.g., Teleconferencing Sys., Inc. v. Databeam Corp., Civ. Act. No. 88-470-A, 1989 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10733, at *50 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 1989h Can Am Indus. v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co., 631 F. Supp. 1180, 1188 (C.D. ID. 1986). But see Arco Indus. v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 730 F. Supp. 59, 70 (W.D. Mich. 1989) !imposing modest monetary sanction). 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 443 
tiffs, and a small number of courts have appeared relatively 
unconcerned about chilling effects.68 The strict warnings, which 
seem like threats that Rule 11 sanctions might be imposed, 
levelled by a few judges against environmental plaintiffs and 
their counsel, could discourage these parties and lawyers.69 
A New Jersey district court also issued an opinion-although 
not for publication in the federal reporter system-that detri-
mentally affects some environmental plaintiffs.70 The plaintiff, a 
public interest litigant that had prevailed on the merits, sought 
to recover attorneys' fees for time spent in drafting a notice of 
intent to sue,-71 a requirement included in numerous environmental 
statutes.72 The plaintiff argued that Rule 11 made "absolutely 
indispensable" the rather extensive prefiling investigation into 
the facts that it had conducted.73 The judge rejected ~his conten-
tion, observing that "[p]re-notice of intent to sue activity is 
analogous to investigative work and as such, is not compensa-
ble."74 
The 1990 Supreme Court case Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.75 
and the Court's 1991 decision in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 
Communications Enterprises76 also could have deleterious conse-
quences for environmental plaintiffs. Application of the very 
deferential abuse of discretion standard of appellate review that 
the Supreme Court enunciated in Cooter will make it more dif-
ficult for environmental plaintiffs to convince appellate courts to 
reverse the adverse Rule 11 determinations of district judges.77 
The Supreme Court majority in Business Guides held that 
represented parties who sign papers have "an affirmative duty 
to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before 
68. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra note 44. 
70. Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Anchor Thread Co., Civ. No. 84-
320(GEB), 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348 (D.N.J. May 1, 1988). 
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988) (Clean Water Act notice of intent to sue require-
ment); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988) (same requirement in the Clean Air Act) .. 
73. Anchor Thread, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4348, at *5. 
74. Id.; accord Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 721 F. Supp. 
604, 615 (D.N.J), affd mem., 870 F .2d 652 (3d Cir.), and rrwdified on reconsideration, 727 F. 
Supp. 876 (D.N.J. 1989); Proffitt v. Municipal Auth., 716 F. Supp. 845, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1989), 
aff d mem., 897 F .2d 523 (1990). But cf. Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. United States Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 732 F. Supp. 1014, 1017-19 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding activity in preparation 
for filing of notice of intent to sue is compensable under Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 
u.s.c. § 2412(d)(l)(A)(1988)). 
75. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990). 
76. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991). 
77. "[A}n appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all 
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filing, and that the applicable standard is one of reasonableness 
under the circumstances."78 The case may disadvantage environ-
mental plaintiffs in several ways. Individual litigants may lack 
access to factual data located on private property owned by 
environmental defendants. They may also have limited resources 
for gathering information that is available and, thus, may appear 
to violate Rule ll's mandates governing prefiling factual inves-
tigations. Because a number of lawyers apparently encounter 
problems understanding the complex statutory schemes that un-
derlie most environmental cases, lay persons could well experi-
ence difficulty complying with the Court's prescription regarding 
legal inquiry. 
Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requires that 
litigants sign applications for Temporary Restraining Orders 
(TROs),79 orders that many environmental plaintiffs seek, for 
example, to halt imminent activity that they believe will irre-
trievably harm the environment.80 Dissenting in Business Guides, 
Justice Kennedy cogently observed that "one may expect reti-
cence to seek temporary restraining orders since the time pres-
sures inherent in such situations create an acute risk of sanctions 
for unreasonable prefiling inquiry."81 Furthermore, the majority, 
by expanding plaintiffs' exposure to liability for attorneys' fees, 
could effectively frustrate congressional intent expressed in fee-
shifting provisions of most environmental statutes: prevailing 
plaintiffs are ordinarily. entitled to attorneys' fees and defendants 
normally are not.82 
aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination." Cooter, 110 S. Ct. at 2461; see also 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 7 (setting forth proposed advisory committee's note, 
which retains identical standard). 
78. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933; see also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 4 
(setting forth proposed Rule ll(c)(2), which would provide that monetary sanctions may be 
awarded against represented party only for violating improper purpose clause). 
79. FED. R. CN. P. 65(b). 
80. See, e.g., Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 266 (1st Cir. 1990); Stein v. 
Barton, 740 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Alaska 1990). See generally VICTOR J. YANNACONE ET AL., 
ENvmoNMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 6:13 (1972 & Supp. 1988) (discussing TROs). 
81. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 941 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
82. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 729 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 
(W .D. Mich. 1989) (prevailing defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees only when they can 
demonstrate that plaintiffs claim was frivolous or meritlessl; Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Realty Invs. Assocs., 524 F. Supp. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying attorneys' fees to 
defendant absent frivolous claim by plaintiff); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988) (Clean Water 
Act fee-shifting provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988) (Clean Air Act fee-shifting provision); 
Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Frant in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, 
Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990) (comprehensive analysis of Supreme 
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In short, the assessment of formal Rule 11 activity in environ-. 
mental litigation reveals that judges and defendants have invoked 
the provision infrequently against plaintiffs. Moreover, few courts 
have found that plaintiffs contravened the Rule, and most that 
did have been solicitous of the litigants' needs when selecting 
appropriate sanctions. The dearth of formal Rule 11 activity that 
has disadvantaged the plaintiffs makes analyzing informal activity 
even more important. 
C. Informal Ru'le 11 Activity 
Ascertaining whether informal Rule 11 activity has negatively 
affected environmental plaintiffs is problematic, primarily be-
cause it is difficult to detect and document, especially in ways 
that support defensible conclusions. For example, it is impossible 
to identify the number of individuals and groups that might have 
pursued environmental litigation, had the threat of Rule 11 sanc-
tions not dampened their enthusiasm.83 Correspondingly, attor-
neys may justifiably be reluctant to challenge or to reveal publicly 
informal judicial application that has disadvantaged them, lest 
the lawyers jeopardize relationships with judges before whom 
they must appear in the future.84 
Some evidence, which is principally anecdotal, indicates that 
considerabJe Rule 11 activity that has disadvantaged civil rights 
plaintiffs and attorneys the most has been informal.85 Troubling 
examples have been judicial threats in chambers to sanction 
litigants and lawyers who wish to pursue claims that the judges 
find marginal and the imposition of large assessments in unpub-
lished opinions.86 At the outset of this study, the idea that 
analogous activity might be similarly affecting environmental 
plaintiffs and practitioners seemed plausible. 
Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence). See generally 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRON· 
MENTAL LAW § 14.02 (1991) (discussing recovery of attorneys'. fees under citizen suit 
provisions); 2 WILLlAM H. RoDGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: Am AND WATER§ 4.5, at 81-
82 (1986) (pointing out that a change in the dual standard for defendants and plaintiffs 
would "dry up all but the open and shut litigation"); Tobias, supra note 13, at 312 & n.252 
(discussing dual standard for shifting fees in civil rights cases). 
83. See Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Ride 11: Objectimf:y and C<Yrnpetence, 123 
F.R.D. 361, 365 (1988); Tobias, supra note 25, at 501-02; Vairo, supra note 3, at 200-01. 
84. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 117 n.59. 
85. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 502-03 & n.60; Tobias, supra note 4, at 117 n.59. 
86. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 117 n.60 (discussing threats to sanction); Charles Presto, 
Esq., statement at the Rule 11 Conference, School of Law, New York University (Nov. 2, 
1990) (remarking that $63,000 sanction was levied in a case for which no opinion was 
published). 
446 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:429 
These hypotheses, therefore, were tested by interviewing many 
attorneys for the plaintiffs and some defense counsel, who pri-
marily represent institutional litigants, such as the National Wild-
life Federation and the federal government. I interviewed directly 
more than twenty-five lawyers who stated that they could speak 
for several hundred additional attorneys with whom they work.87 
The lawyers reported a low incidence of informal Rule 11 
activity in environmental cases. Attorneys for environmental 
defendants and judges seem to have employed the Rule somewhat 
more frequently in informal contexts but to no worse effect for 
the plaintiffs. These findings contrast sharply with the experience 
of civil rights plaintiffs. Substantial formal and informal activity 
has disadvantaged the plaintiffs, and informal activity may have 
affected them more significantly.88 
Lawyers who represent institutional plaintiffs stated that the 
parties have encountered minimal informal Rule 11 activity, little 
of which has detrimentally affected them.89 The attorneys re-
ported that defense counsel only occasionally have threatened 
orally to invoke Rule 11 or hi the text or footnotes of motions 
or briefs as a crude form of "finger-pointing."90 The director of 
a law school environmental law clinic remembered being "threat-
ened one time by a Justice Department attorney" in nine years 
of litigating environmental cases.91 One lawyer associated with a 
similar organization had experienced "no Rule 11 activity at all" 
during the same period, while a professor who worked in a third 
law school clinical setting over six semesters had "not seen 
P!l. The reason that the lawyers with whom I spoke could speak for many others was 
that they worked in rather large legal offices, such as the Department of Justice or the 
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. I called the attorneys, identified myself, asked them about 
their experiences with Rule 11 and those of any other environmental plaintiffs of which 
they were aware, sought their views on why there was so little formal Rule 11 activity in 
environmental (as opposed to civil rights) cases, and inquired whether they had experienced 
any informal Rule 11 activity. The lawyers are identified only by numbers, because it 
seemed appropriate to maintain confidentiality and to help preserve the attorneys' ongoing 
relations with judges and lawyers with whom they will be involved in future litigation. See 
supa note 84 and accompanying text. Most of the information reported below pertains to 
informal Rule 11 activity, although some relates to formal activity. 
88. See supa note 26 and accompanying text (indicating substantial quantity of formal 
activity); Tobias, supa note 25, at 502-03 (discussing substantial quantity of informal activity 
that disadvantages civil rights plaintiffs); Tobias, supa note 4, at 117-18 (same). 
89. This statement is premised on telephone conversations with numerous attorneys 
representing institutional plaintiffs (Mar.-Apr. 1991). The reasons for the lack of negative 
activity are reported in Part m of this Article. 
90. This statement is premised on telephone conversations with numerous attorneys who 
represent institutional plaintiffs (Mar.-Apr. 1991). 
91. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 1 (Mar. 14, 1991). 
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anything in the Rule 11 area."92 An attorney who has adminis-
tered an external clinic for eight years observed that lawyers 
for defendants had "not threatened me with Rule 11 sanctions."93 
Attorneys responsible for two of the largest legal offices main-
tained by institutional environmental plaintiffs afforded similar 
observations. Both of these lawyers stated that judges had never 
granted Rule 11 sanctions against their organizations.94 One at-
torney could recall only a single instance in which a motion had 
been filed against the group and thought that Rule 11 was "not 
being used very extensively informally" in environmental law-
suits.95 
The lawyer for the other entity, which conducts more environ-
mental litigation than any of the national organizations, said that 
the public interest litigant had "been the subject of some Rule 
11 motions.''96 He also circulated a. memorandum to the other 
twenty attorneys who work for the group seeking their perspec-
tives on Rule 11 activity.97 
The results of that survey confirmed many of the propositions 
stated above.98 The attorneys reported three instances in which 
opposing lawyers had filed sanctions motions against the entity, 
all of which were denied, and said that there was a low incidence 
of informal Rule 11 activity in their cases, with defense counsel 
often levelling informal threats to invoke the provision.99 
Attorneys who administer three other sizable offices, which 
participate in somewhat less litigation, offered similar thoughts.100 
One of the lawyers stated that sanctions had never been sought 
against the organization and believed that "strikingly little" Rule 
11 activity of any kind was present in environmental cases.101 
The second attorney remembered a "single Rule 11 motion" that 
was filed against the litigant and that was "defeated pretty 
92. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 2 (Mar. 14, 1991). 
93. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 3 (Mar. 14, 1991). 
94. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 4 (Mar. 14, 1991). 
95. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 5 and Number 6 (Mar. 14, 1991). 
96. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 5, su:pra note 95. 
97. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 6, supra note 95. 
98. Survey of lawyers conducted by Attorney Number 6 (copy on file with author) 
[hereinafter Survey). 
99. Id.; Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 6, supra note 95. One of the motions 
filed by an opposing lawyer was a response to the Rule 11 motion that the organization 
filed against an environmental defendant and was one of a tiny number of motions that 
plaintiffs filed. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
100. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 7 (Apr. 4, 1991) and Number 8 (Apr. 
2, 1991). 
101. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 7, supra note 100. 
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handily,"102 while the other lawyer had "not seen much Rule 11 
activity" in the group's lawsuits.103 
Several other attorneys who are or were associated with in-
stitutional environmental plaintiffs and a few lawyers who are in 
private practice provided similar information. For instance, most 
of the attorneys recalled one or a very small number of cases in 
which defense counsel moved for sanctions or suggested infor-
mally that they might invoke the Rule.104 Attorneys for plaintiffs 
correspondingly could remember virtually no circumstances in 
which judges determined that environmental plaintiffs contra-
vened Rule 11.105 
The perceptions of lawyers who have been involved pi rather 
controversial environmental litigation were not substantially dif-
ferent.106 One attorney, who enjoys a reputation as a tough, savvy 
litigator and has participated in numerous suits over old growth 
timber and the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest, experienced 
little informal Rule 11 activity in those cases.107 The lawyer could 
recall only one instance in which defendants invoked the Rule 
against his client, and that situation involved a cross-motion filed 
in response to the organization's request for Rule 11 sanctions.108 
An attorney who has brought a number of toxic tort suits 
remarked that there had "not been much Rule 11 activity in my 
cases."109 Another lawyer who has pursued numerous toxic tort 
actions had "not seen that many suits where plaintiffs have gotten 
hit with Rule 11 sanctions" and observed that defense counsel 
do "not even bring up Rule 11 formally in my cases."110 The 
attorney added, however, that the "threat of Rule 11 is very 
pervasive" and that he "never had been in a case where lawyers 
don't talk about Rule 11" or invoke some form of counter-suit.m 
A third attorney observed that he had "rarely seen any use of 
102. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 8, su:pra note 100. 
103. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 9 !Apr. 9, 1991). 
104. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 10 (Mar. 14, 1991), Number 11 !Mar. 
14, 1991), and Number 12 (Apr. 4, 1991). 
105. Telephone Interviews, supa note 104. 
106. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 13 (Apr. 2, 1991), Number 14 !Apr. 
9, 1991), Number 15 (Apr. 9, 1991), Number 16 (Apr. 9, 1991), and Number 17 (Apr. 9, 1991). 
107. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supa note 106. 
108. Id.; see also infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
109. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 14, supa note 106. For helpful analysis 
of toxic tort litigation, see Allan Kanner, The Evolving Jurispruderu;e of Toxic Torls: The 
ProgrUJsis for CorporatiaruJ, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1265 (1991). 
110. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, SU]Yl"fL note 106. 
111. Id.; see infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (discussing use of countersuits as 
an alternative to use of Rule 11). 
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the Rule" in the litigation that he pursues.112 The lawyer made 
this statement even though he has participated in all kinds of 
environmental suits, including toxics cases, for fifteen years-as 
counsel for local and national environmental groups and for 
parties in the Exxon Valdez dispute-and has practiced primarily 
in a federal district that generally experiences much Rule 11 
activity .113 
An attorney who represents industry members in considerable 
toxic tort and CERCLA litigation believed that Rule 11 has been 
employed more frequently in these than other environmental 
cases, even though CERCLA actions "almost always settle and 
it is very likely that a lot of Rule 11 motions come out in the 
wash."114 The lawyer added that in-house counsel for one large 
company, which plaintiffs often sue in asbestos cases, routinely 
responds to "complaints by sending Rule 11 letters [which] result 
in most actions being dropped or withdrawn."115 
One attorney who has brought numerous citizen suits seeking 
enforcement under the Clean Water Act could recall several 
situations in which defendants resorted to the Rule but was "not 
aware of any case where a Rule 11 motion was granted."116 A 
second lawyer who has litigated many similar actions stated that 
there was "finger-pointing by defendants in briefs filed in a 
number of cases but the parties never formally pursued Rule 11 
with the courts."117 The attorney remembered one instance in 
which defendants argued to the judge that the plaintiffs "pre-
complaint activity violated Rule 11"; however, the court found 
the contention so "frivolous that it merited no attention."118 
A lawyer who has filed more than fifty citizen suits under the 
Clean Water Act observed that defense counsel frequently raise 
Rule 11 but that reliance on the provision is "more tactical than 
substantive."119 The attorney stated that Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
112. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 16, su:pra note 106. 
113. Id. 
114. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 17, supra note 106. 
115. Id. 
116. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 18 (Apr. 2, 1991). For a comprehensive 
analysis of citizen suits, see Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regul.atnry 
Enf<mement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 
34 BuFF. L. REV. 833 (1985). 
117. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 19 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
118. Id. 
119. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 20 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
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Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation120 "generated enormous prac-
tice on pretrial issues" in Water Act enforcement litigation and 
that defense counsel regularly allude to Rule 11 when filing 
pretrial motions.121 The lawyer recalled one citizen suit in which 
a district court imposed a $5000 sanction on a public interest 
litigant for "failing to perform sufficient legal inquiry," because 
the group pursued an action that the judge believed that Gwalt-
ney barred.122 
Few attorneys who represent. environmental plaintiffs men-
tioned invoking Rule 11 against environmental defendants,123 and 
a small number of practitioners expressly stated that it is not a 
provision that the plaintiffs use.124 Several of the lawyers did 
say, however, that they would not hesitate to file motions if 
defense counsel "crossed the line."125 Moreover, one attorney 
actually sought Rule 11 sanctions· in controversial litigation in-
volving timber practices in the Northwest, when the opposition 
requested that the court modify an injunction for the third time 
and tendered "demonstrably false information."126 
The incidence of informal judicial activity involving Rule 11 
appears to be considerably smaller. The lawyers reported that a 
minuscule number of courts had threatened to sanction plaintiffs 
if they continued the pursuit of counts that the judges thought 
lacked merit, although virtually no courts levied awards against 
the parties in unpublished decisions.127 Typical was the observa-
tion of one lawyer who stated that no judge has "threatened me 
120. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The Gwaltney opinion alludes to the possibility that Rule 11 
justified the Court's disposition, but the opinion does not speak directly to the Rule's 
application. Id. at 65. 
121. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 20, supra note 119. The majority in 
Gwaltney prohibited citizen suits for past violations, thus triggering considerable litigation 
over the timing of violations. See Beverly McQueary Smith, TM Viability of Citizens' Suits 
Urukr the Clean Water Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1989-90). 
122. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 20, supra note 119. The case was 
Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 87-39E (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 16, 1988). See supra note 27. 
123. This conclusion is based on telephone conversations with numerous environmental 
attorneys (Mar.-Apr., 1991). 
124. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 9, supra note 103, and Number 12, 
supra note 104. 
125. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supra note 106; Survey, supra note 
98. 
126. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, supra note 106. 
127. This conclusion is premised on telephone conversations with numerous attorneys 
(Mar.-Apr., 1991). The only unpublished opinion of which I am aware is mentioned above at 
notes 27, 122 and the accompanying text. The incidence was much lower than in civil rights 
cases. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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with Rule 11 sanctions" in eight years of litigating environmental 
cases.128 
In short, there has been a clear paucity of formal, and an 
apparent dearth of informal, Rule 11 activity in environmental 
lawsuits. Although this relative inactivity makes it difficult to 
draw definitive conclusions or to make generalizations that apply 
to different contexts, analysis of Rule ll's implementation in 
environmental cases yields instructive insights on modern civil 
litigation. For instance, it shows why judges and parties eschew 
reliance on the provision and invoke alternatives in environmental 
suits, even as they vigorously employ the Rule in certain forms 
of modern litigation. Moreover, the Rule 11 activity that has 
occurred supports credible hypotheses that warrant comparison 
with those derived from studying other forms of civil litigation. 
The propositions can also be tested by collecting, assessing, and 
synthesizing the type of information, such as that on informal 
Rule 11 activity, which I have previously suggested should be 
assembled and analyzed.129 The third Part of this Article, there-
fore, examines the consequences of Rule 11 activity in environ-
mental cases. 
ill. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS 
A. Why H@ There Been So Little Rule 11 Activity? 
Many plausible reasons explain the deart~ of Rule 11 activity 
in environmental litigation. These explanations enhance appreci-
ation of environmental plaintiffs and defendants, of those lawyers 
who pursue the cases and of judges who hear the suits, and of 
the litigation its.elf, while informing understanding of the contem-
porary legal culture in the federal courts. 
1. Environmental Litigants and Attorneys 
Numerous apparent reasons exist for the limited amount of 
Rule 11 activity in environmental lawsuits. One important cluster 
of explanations relates to the identities of the parties and attor-
neys who are involved in much environmental litigation and their 
respective resources for participating. Many plaintiffs, typically 
governmental or public interest entities, and a number of defen-
128. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 3, supra note 93. 
129. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 522-23; Tobias, supra note 4, at 125. 
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dants, generally governmental or regulated interests, are "insti-
tutional litigants"; most of them have considerable time and 
energy as well as some specialized expertise and enjoy favorable 
ongoing relations with the judiciary.130 
a. Institutional Environmental Plaintiffs and Attorneys 
(1). The Government as Environmental Plaintiff 
The federal government, when determining whether to file 
papers and preparing the relevant documents once it decides to 
file, relies on elaborate review procedures and draws on substan-
tial policy, legal, and technical expertise.131 The government usu-
ally employs a multitiered, interdisciplinary decisionmaking 
process, especially when considering a complaint, the document 
that courts sanction most frequently. 
Policymakers, technical experts, and lawyers in an agency 
contemplating suit-such as the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA); attorneys from the Environment and Natural Resources· 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which possesses 
primary governmental responsibility for litigating environmental 
cases; and the United States Attorneys' Offices, which have local 
litigating authority-thoroughly review the relevant public pol-
icy, technical, and legal factors, including the prospects for suc-
cess. If those decisionmakers conclude that papers should be 
filed, numerous individuals help prepare the documents. 
Lawyers in the DOJ and in the United States Attorneys' 
Offices work closely with their counterparts in the responsible 
agency, such as the EPA's Office of General Counsel, and with 
the agency's technical experts, such as wildlife biologists and 
engineers. The attorneys carefully research and develop the legal 
theories that underlie the papers, while the policy and technical 
personnel collect, analyze, and synthesize supporting factual in-
130. That is, in comparison with individual civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys. See 
generally ARON, supa note 21 (discussing public interest litigants as institutional litigants); 
SCHUCK, supa note 21 (discussing government as institutional litigant); Boyer & Meidinger, 
supra note 116 (discussing continuing relations); Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98 (discussing 
resources of civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys); Symposium, Law, Private Governance and 
Continuing Relati.onships, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 461-757 (same). 
131. I rely substantially in this Part of the Article on my experience as a legal consultant 
for the Food and Drug Administration Office of General Counsel and as a lawyer in private 
practice working with the Environmental Protection Agency in several proceedings and 
pieces of litigation, on telephone conversations with a number of government attorneys 
(Nov. 14, 1990), and on in-person conversations with several government attorneys (Nov. 3, 
1990). See generally Robert L. Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L. 
REV. 759 (1951) (exploring government attorneys' representation of the government). 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 453 
formation. All of these individuals help to write drafts, which 
are circulated to persons in the various offices having policy, 
legal, and technical expertise for criticisms and suggestions, es-
pecially regarding legal and factual accuracy. The ideas secured 
are assimilated in revising the documents and in developing final 
drafts of the papers for filing. 
Many attorneys in the DOJ, the United States Attorneys' 
Offices, and the client agencies have accumulated extensive ex-
perience in the environmental law field or in litigating environ-
mental cases, and a number of the lawyers are very familiar with 
the applicable substantive statutes or even have participated in 
drafting or implementing the measures. Numerous technical per-
sonnel possess analogous specialized knowledge in their particular 
areas of expertise and have significant time and money to gather, 
assess, and synthesize the requisite information for completing 
reasonable prefiling investigations of the facts. If they do not 
satisfactorily finish this task, the attorneys have sufficient ex-
pertise and resources to insure that the work is properly con-
cluded, to research and formulate defensible legal theories, and 
to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries into the law. 
A lawyer who is now in private practice but once served as a 
high-level official' in the Environment and Natural Resources 
Division, offered an example that aptly summarizes the proposi-
tions examined above.132 He stated that in "environmental tort-
type litigation, the Justice Department employed storybook, not 
notice, pleading and filed complaints that were premised on a lot 
of research, included lots of allegations, were very substantial, 
and were never vulnerable to motions to dismiss."133 The lawyer 
added that the government "spends much money on waste re-
porting and investigations" and that the major environmental 
statutes impose "significant monitoring and reporting require-
ments" on regulated interests, so that the DOJ can secure con-
siderable factual data before filing.134 
(2). The PUblic Interest Litigant as Environmental 
Plaintiff 
Most of these ideas apply, perhaps somewhat less pervasively, 
together with numerous additional propositions, to public interest 
132. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 21 (Apr. 9, 1991). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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litigants.135 For instance, entities such as Defenders of Wildlife 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) rely on 
multilayered, .interdisciplinary procedures in determining whether 
to file papers and in preparing the documents that they ultimately 
submit.136 
The organizations employ numerous staff attorneys who pos-
sess much relevant specialized expertise, having practiced envi-
ronmental law exclusively for many years.137 Indeed one former 
assistant administrator of the EPA stated that the "environmen-
tal bar that brings suit for the national litigants is very sophis-
ticated legally and [is] not likely to make big legal or factual 
mistakes or errors in judgment."138 A former high-level lawyer 
in the agency similarly remarked that attorneys for the "groups 
are much too good to advance legal theories that would get them 
into Rule 11 trouble."139 
The lawyers, as staff attorneys, identify closely with the public 
interest litigants. The lawyers are acutely aware that the need 
to resist Rule 11 motions and to pay any sanctions assessed can 
have potentially damaging impacts on organizational morale and 
finances, so they exercise great care in deciding to tender papers 
and in preparing them. For instance, a lawyer who represents 
one of the major groups said, "frankly, we don't have the re-
sources to bring questionable or frivolous litigation."14° Corre-
spondingly, environmental public interest entities, such as the 
Environmental Defense Fund, have rather large in-house staffs 
including engineers and scientists with substantial particularized 
knowledge in technical fields that are crucial to environmental 
litigation.141 
Although most of these organizations possess more resources 
than a number of private individuals, the public interest litigants 
have considerably fewer funds than the government,142 which 
135. I rely substantially in this part of the Article on my experience as a lawyer working 
for and against public interest litigants and on the telephone interviews, supra notes 87- • 
128. See generally ARON, supra note 21 (providing background description of public interest 
law and lawyers). 
136. This assertion is premised principally on my knowledge of the legal staffs of the 
National Wildlife Federation, the NRDC, and the Sierra Club, gleaned from working for 
the Federation in one of its law school clinics and against NRDC in a number of proceedings, 
and from the telephone interviews. See supra notes 87, 89-97, 99-119, 121, 123-128. 
137. Id. 
138. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 22 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
139. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 17, supra note 106. 
140. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 9, supra note 103. 
141. Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Puhlic Interest Groups, Puhlic Law Litigation and Federal 
Rvl.e 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 295-303 (1990). 
142. See supra note 25. 
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means that the groups must maximize the benefit derived from 
the time and effort spent on litigation. This relative dearth of 
resources and other factors, such as the large quantity of envi-
ronmental lawsuits that could be brought, make the entities 
extremely selective about the cases that they file. 
The organizations carefully choose the litigation that the groups 
are most likely to win, that will have the greatest impact, and 
in which they will be able to recover attorneys' fees. One lawyer 
in private practice observed that the entities "know that they 
are not playing with someone else's money and that if the 
organizations are going to be paid they must win," while the 
groups "will not waste the time if they will not get paid."143 A 
former EPA assistant administrator claimed that the national 
entities may even refuse to "take hard cases where the proof is 
difficult, because there are so many easy ones in which they will 
be sure to get attorneys' fees awards."144 
Institutional public interest litigants have successfully settled 
or won much of the litigation that they have filed, at least in the 
lower federal courts.145 Indeed, numerous attorneys who repre-
sent the organizations and other lawyers recited in mock seri-
ousness the following litany: the lack of Rule 11 activity in 
environmental cases is attributable to the careful prefiling work 
of plaintiffs' attorneys, as demonstrated by their success on the 
merits.146 
(3). Similar Characteristics of Institutional Environmental 
Plaintiffs 
Many institutional plaintiffs and their lawyers seem to enjoy 
relatively congenial, ongoing relations with judges-rapport that 
143. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 16, supra note 106. 
144. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 22, supra note 138; cf. John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Understanding th£ Pl.ainti.ffs Attorney: The Implications of Ec<mmnic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Th:rou.gh Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) 
(discussing attorneys' financial incentives and disincentives for litigation). 
145. The high success rate in the major category of environmental litigation that chal-
lenges agency regulatory action or inaction is substantially attributable to the unrealistic 
temporal deadlines that Congress imposes on the agencies. See, e.g., Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. 
Costle, 610 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Ill. 1985). But cf. RoDGERS, supra not~ 82, S 4.6, at 88 
(observing that environmental plaintiffs usually lose in the Supreme Court). See generally 
GAIL BINGHA~l, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (1985) 
(analyzing resolution of environmental controversies, especially through alternative dispute 
resolution). 
146. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 2, supra note 92, Number 5, supra 
note 95, Number 7, supra note 100, Number 9, supra note 103, and Number 13, supra note 
106. 
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can be ascribed principally to the status of the parties and 
attorneys as repeat players who apparently have earned judges' 
respect for the quality of their work.147 For example, in numerous 
federal districts, one Assistant United States Attorney is re-
sponsible for handling all environmental cases.148 The United 
States Attorneys' Offices must also cultivate and retain good 
relations with judges before whom their lawyers appear daily. 
Moreover, many federal judges actually are former United States 
Attorneys or worked in the Offices as assistant prosecutors and, 
thus, should be intimately familiar with the high professional 
standards that prevail in most Offices.149 Correspondingly, a single 
NRDC lawyer, who monitors EPA implementation of the Clean 
Water Act and attempts to secure agency compliance with stat-
utory commands, may pursue numerous lawsuits against the EPA 
in the identical court or make multiple appearances before the 
same judge.150 
Analogous elements are at work when public interest organi-
zations intervene on behalf of the government-as the groups do 
in much litigation that regulated industries bring and in a number 
of cases that the government files-and even when public interest 
litigants sue the government.151 Public interest entities, the gov-
147. See Symposium, supra note 130 (discussing effects of continuing relations); Marc 
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (classifying parties as ''repeat players"). 
148. Similarly, lawyers in DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division may be 
responsible for certain substantive categories of litigation, such as that involving air quality 
or public lands, or for litigation arising from specific regions of the country, such as the 
Ninth Circuit. 
149. Of the 774 federal district judges currently on the bench, 175 have worked as United 
States Attorneys or Assistant United States Attorneys. Search of Westlaw, AFJ <Almanac 
of the Federal Judiciary) file (Sept. 26, 1991); see JEROME R. CovsI, JUDICIAL POLITICS-AN 
INTRODUCTION 140 (1984) (administrations other than Carter's turned heavily toward United 
States Attorneys for district court appointees); see also ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEm MEMBERS, PRocEDURES AND CANDIDATES 
122 (19811 (citing survey of Carter administration nominees for district judgeships that 
revealed that many had prosecution experience in federal courts). 
150. This situation obtained, for example, in the 1970's when NRDC was monitoring EPA 
implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and 
successfully challenged much EPA action or inaction in the District of Columbia District 
Court. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D.D.C.J 
(J.G. Speth, attorney), affd sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564 
F .2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (same); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. 
Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), aff d, 568 F .2d 1369 ID.C. Cir. 1977) (same). 
151. Environmental litigation, especially challenges to agency regulatory action, has 
increasingly assumed a tripolar party structure, involving the government, public interest 
litigants, and regulated interests. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 
480 U.S. 370 (1987); United States v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 922 F .2d 704 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 457 
ernment, and the attorneys who work for these institutions have, 
and recognize the need to maintain, comparatively cordial rela-
tions with one another. Both sides, therefore, are loath to seek 
Rule 11 sanctions, lest the Rule's invocation raise the stakes in 
specific controversies and jeopardize relationships involving or-
ganizations with which they must litigate many future environ-
mental disputes.152 
These factors significantly increase the likelihood that the 
papers that government and public interest litigants, as plaintiffs, 
submit in environmental cases actually are, or appear to be, 
preceded by reasonable legal inquiries and reasonable factual 
investigations, well considered, fully tested for accuracy, properly 
grounded in fact, and legally warranted. The considerations have 
limited the amount of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation 
and plaintiffs' concomitant vulnerability to sanctions. 
(4). Civil Rights Plaintiffs and Attorneys Contrasted 
Most of the circumstances above appear attributable primarily 
to the institutional character of environmental plaintiffs and to 
the ways that their lawyers represent the entities. Indeed, courts 
have sanctioned relatively few institutional plaintiffs, such as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), or 
their counsel in civil rights cases,153 despite the high incidence of 
(11th Cir.1991); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1989). See generally 
Carl Tobias, Swnding w Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415 (discussing intervention of right 
under Rule 24(a)(2) and party structure in public law litigation). 
152. One lawyer for a public interest litigant observed that the "organization litigates 
against the government across the country and that both sides are concerned about 
maintaining their ongoing relationships and would be reluctant to disrupt them with Rule 
11.'' Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 13, Wipra note 106. 
Certain considerations similar to those discussed in the text also may obtain when 
"noninstitutional" plaintiffs, such as victims of exposure to toxic· chemicals, pursue toxic 
tort litigation. I spoke to relatively few attorneys who participate in such litigation. One of 
the lawyers did say, however, that the plaintiffs he represents "conduct well tests and soil 
samples before anyone is willing to file suit" and collect the "information that they need 
to prove their cases up front." See also supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (attorney's 
observations as to DOJ apply equally to his clients); supra notes 110-11 and accompanying 
text (views of another lawyer who pursues toxic tort litigation). 
153. See, e.g., NAACP-Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F .2d 336 (8th Cir. 1990); 
cf. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F .2d 525, 549-50 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating 
trial judge's order prohibiting NAACP Legal Defense Fund from paying sanctions imposed 
on Julius Chambers for participation in litigation that preceded his assumption of post as 
NAACP Executive Director), cert. den:ied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Of course, the imposition 
of one large sanction on a public interest litigant can chill the enthusiasm of these litigants. 
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Rule 11 activity in those lawsuits mentioned throughout this 
Article. 
The conditions that exist for a number of civil rights plaintiffs, 
particularly individuals or "noninstitutional" litigants, contrast 
markedly with those of many environmental plaintiffs.154 Most 
compelling may be the significant resource disparities that exist 
between numerous civil rights attorneys and plaintiffs on the one 
hand and environmental lawyers and plaintiffs, as well as cor-
porate or governmental counsel and litigants, on the other. 
The civil rights bar consists principally of solo practitioners, a 
number of whom may possess rather limited time, money, and 
experience. The lawyers have difficulty absorbing the "front-end" 
costs of litigation and depend substantially on fee shifting for 
their compensation.155 Most of the attorneys have few resources 
for performing extensive legal research, developing creative legal 
theories, and conducting comprehensive factual investigations in 
the unusual instances when they have access to pertinent mate-
rial.156 Certain lawyers might possess somewhat narrow expertise, 
because civil rights cases constitute an insignificant component 
of their practices. 
Recent Supreme Court opinions implicating much civil rights 
law, whose effects are now being manifested in the lower federal 
courts, may have diminished additionally the rather small pool 
of civil rights attorneys with substantial experience. For instance, 
during the mid-1980's, the Court interpreted two Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure together with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act)157 in ways that apparently have 
complicated the efforts of civil rights lawyers to recover attor-
neys' fees.158 
See Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing a $1,034,381.36 sanction 
on public interest litigant), afj'd, 932 F .2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 
3467 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992). To detect exactly how much sanctioning involves institutional 
litigants is difficult. For instance, the ACLU, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club may be 
representing local affiliates or individuals, and their representation rarely can be discerned 
from the captions and text of cases. 
154. This part of the subsection relies substantially on Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98. 
155. Id. at 496 n.41. 
156. Id. at 497. 
157. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1988). 
158. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (Rule 23(e)); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 
(1985) (Rule 68); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F .2d 651, 661-64 (4th Cir. 1990) (example 
of problematic application of Rule 68 by lower federal court); Phillips v. Allegheny County, 
869 F .2d 234, 235-40 (3d Cir. 1989) (same as to Rule 23(e)); see cdso Brand, supra note 82 
(providing comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court's fee-shifting jurisprudence); infra 
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Numerous civil rights lawyers have reputations as vigorous, 
and frequently contentious, advocates for the individuals whom 
they represent. A number of the attorneys view civil rights 
actions in federal court as the only realistic recourse available 
to persons who, for example, have no jobs because they were 
victims of employment discrimination, or have been languishing 
in prisons, because they were deprived of constitutional rights. 
Some of the lawyers may zealously take on their clients' cases 
as "causes" or to vindicate what they believe are significant 
political, social, moral, or economic principles. 
Few potential civil rights plaintiffs, especially those who would 
pursue cases individually, rather than as members of institutional 
litigants or as participants in class actions, can offset these 
circumstances, particularly the financial difficulties. Most persons 
who could sue have little access to, and minimal resources for 
collecting and evaluating, data that are significant to completing 
prefiling factual investigations that appear reasonable.159 Numer-
ous potential litigants may not know what facts or legal elements 
they must allege to make out a civil rights claim. They may even 
be unaware that their constitutional or statutory rights were 
violated. Several of these considerations mean that practically no 
civil rights plaintiffs and comparatively few· civil rights attorneys 
have continuing or harmonious relations with federal judges, 
particularly in contrast with institutional litigants and lawyers 
who participate in civil rights and environmental litigation. 
These factors can make the papers that civil rights plaintiffs 
and their counsel file look as if they were preceded by deficient 
legal inquiries or factual investigations or were not well-grounded 
factually or warranted legally. These considerations also help to 
explain the substantial quantity of Rule 11 activity in civil rights 
cases and the corresponding susceptibility of plaintiffs to being 
sanctioned. 
b. Institutional Environmental Defendants and Attorneys 
The institutional nature of many environmental defendants and 
the perspectives of the Iawyers who represent them also help to 
notes 206-10 and accompanying text (discussing how Supreme Court and lower federal court 
narrowing of much doctrinal civil rights law has exacerbated these developments in litigation 
financing). See ge-neraJly Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empi,rical Research on Off era 
of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas., Autumn 1988, at 13 
(examining offers of settlement under Rule 68); Tobias, SU'JYfa note 13, at 310-17 (discussing 
the significance of judicial application of federal rules relevant to litigation financing for 
public interest litigants). 
159. Tobias, SU'JYfa note 13, at 309. 
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explain the rather low incidence of formal and informal Rule 11 
activity in environmental lawsuits. Quite a few factors that are 
relevant to this relative inactivity have been mentioned or alluded 
to earlier in the Article.160 
(1). The Government as Defendant 
When an agency of the federal government is the defendant, 
as happens in much environmental litigation that public interest 
groups pursue, several important considerations substantially 
liniit the amount of Rule 11 activity. One significant element is 
the governmental practice of seeking sanctions only in egregious 
cases. Although this is not a formal, written policy of the DOJ 
or of federal agencies, numerous lawyers who work for the Justice 
Department, for the agencies, and for public interest organiza-
tions have stated that the government is very "conservative" 
about filing Rule 11 motions and does so only when its opponents 
have seriously abused the litigation process.161 The practice may 
reflect concern of the government and its attorneys about re-
stricting federal court access and the view that Rule 11 should 
be reserved for special circumstances.162 
Numerous attorneys in the DOJ's Environment and Natural 
Resources Division have considerable experience litigating envi-
ronmental cases, are comparatively insulated from political pres-
160. See, e.g., supra note 130 and accompanying text. Here I rely substantially on the 
considerations mentioned supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text. 
161. See Telephone and in-person conversations, supra note 131; Telephone Interviews 
with Attorneys Number 7, supra note 100, and Number 10, supra note 104. This may soon 
change, however, with the issuance by President Bush of an Executive Order that instructs 
litigation counsel for the federal government to "take steps to seek sanctions against 
opposing counsel and "opposing parties where appropriate.'' Exec. Order No. 12,778 § l(f), 
56 Fed. Reg. 55,195, 55,197 (1991). 
162. The assertion regarding federal court access is controversial. For example, during 
certain presidential administrations, lawyers in DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources 
Division apparently asserted procedural technicalities, such as standing, to avoid reaching 
the merits of a case. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990); 
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see al.so Marianne Lavelle, Out of B<JUruis?, NAT'L 
L.J ., Dec. 9, 1991, at 1 (analysis of Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F .2d 117 (8th Cir. 
1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991), in which DOJ urged the Supreme Court to 
impose unprecedented limitations on citizen standing to sue in environmental cases). See 
generolly Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 494 (1986) (increased use of procedural technicalities to avoid adjudicating civil disputes). 
For case law suggesting that Rule 11 be reserved for special circumstances, see Gaiardo v. 
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987); Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 
823 F.2d 1073, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 
(1988). 
" 
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sure, are accustomed to defending the government against suit 
by public interest litigants, and treat the agencies that they 
represent as clients from which they maintain a healthy detach-
ment.163 These lawyers, the DOJ, and the agencies have and 
appreciate the necessity of perpetuating good relations with many 
environmental plaintiffs who will participate in future cases in-
volving the government. Moreover, governmental defendants are 
not threatened personally or institutionally by most environmen-
tal litigation, which frequently includes relatively bland assertions 
that an agency failed to comply with a congressionally imposed 
deadline or misinterpreted a statute, and which seeks rather 
mundane relief, such as promulgation of regulations by a specific 
date.164 
DOJ attorneys and the agencies that they represent thus have 
few reasons for seeking sanctions from, and a number of disin-
centives to invoking Rule 11 against, environmental plaintiffs. 
An attorney for environmental plaintiffs, whom the government 
had not threatened with Rule 11 sanctions in eight years of 
litigating, observed that there is "fairly high cordiality of gov-
ernment lawyers on natural resource issues," while Justice De-
partment attorneys are very business-like and are often more 
"sympathetic to plaintiffs' cases than their own."165 
(2). The Private Entity as Defendant 
Even private environmental defendants, such as corporations, 
are rather unlikely to file Rule 11 motions against environmental 
plaintiffs. When the federal government or public interest liti-
gants, purportedly representing the public, have sued companies 
over environmental degradation, the defendants may already be 
worried about harm to their reputations. The corporations, there-
fore, may hesitate to seek sanctions, lest invocation of Rule 11 
be perceived as a counterattack on these plaintiffs and generate 
additional adverse publicity. 
Institutions, not individuals, typically are the target of accu-
sations that their actions have damaged the environment. These 
assertions currently carry less social stigma than allegations of 
163. See Beth Nolan, Rerruwi:ng Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of 
Interest and IrW.ependent Counsels Under the Ethics in Gavernment Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 41-
42 (1990) (categorizing government lawyers' employment agency as a client). 
164. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F .2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Castle, 610 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. ID. 1985). 
165. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 3, su:pra note 93. 
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discrimination. Numerous corporations may feel that they have 
certain responsibilities to cooperate with government agencies 
which generally attempt to implement complex environmental 
statutes in good faith, and other companies could believe that 
cooperation will be preferable for their reputations or their 
balance sheets. Some of these concerns may lead a number of 
corporations to "internalize" litigation costs-which could be 
rather small, especially for companies with in-house counsel or 
that can absorb the expense as a "cost of doing business" - rather 
than rely on Rule 11 to recover the expenditures.166 
Even when environmental defendants retain outside counsel, 
as many corporations do, similar circumstances may pertain. 
Numerous large law firms that represent a number of companies 
have been reluctant to invoke Rule 11, requiring, for instance, 
that attorneys or clients who wish to pursue sanctions secure 
the approval of firm management committees.167 This reticence 
partly reflects certain norms prevalent in the "legal cultures" of 
many substantial firms. These norms include a desire to resolve 
litigation on the merits and the wish to maintain harmonious, 
continuing relations with federal judges as well as a distaste for 
the unseemly appearance that might attend the filing of Rule 11 
motions and the concomitant loss of credibility that could accom-
pany the denial of sanctions requests.168 Some corporations and 
certain of their counsel, either in-house or external, may prefer 
to secure and maintain cordial relations with environmental plain-
tiffs who will participate in future environmental controversies 
involving the companies.169 
Finally, numerous governmental and private environmental 
defendants might not seek Rule 11 sanctions because they think 
166. Several attorneys for environmental plaintiffs observed that large consumer-oriented 
corporate entities, such as Fortune 500 firms, probably consider the risk of adverse publicity 
accompanying the filing of a Rule 11 motion to outweigh the advantage of any monetary 
sanction that might be awarded. Telephone Interviews with Attorney Number 8, supra 
note 100: Attorneys Number 10, Number 11, and Number 12, supra note 104; cf. infra note 
244 (noting that local or regional entities typically bring SLAPP suits). 
167. See Carl Tobias, Reassessing Ruk 11 and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 175 
(1990). Attorneys in these firms apparently have been more willing to invoke Rule 11 in 
litigation involving insurers and corporations under CERCLA, because the financial stakes 
are much higher. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; infra note 204. 
168. These ideas are based on conversations with numerous attorneys who practice 
primarily in large cities. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF 
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORl\IATION OF THE BIG LAW FmllI (1991) (analyzing legal culture in 
large law firms). 
169. The companies and attorneys probably enjoy less cordial relations quantitatively 
and qualitatively than those that obtain between the government and public interest 
litigants. See supra notes 147-48, 160 and accompanying text. 
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that the prospects for success would be minimal. The limited 
likelihood of succeeding is attributable to a number of consider-
ations. Important factors are the quality of the legal work that 
institutional environmental plaintiffs produce, including the rea-
sonable nature of prefiling inquiries that they conduct and the 
thoroughly researched papers that they file, the relatively cordial 
relations that many plaintiffs enjoy with judges, and the concom-
itant solicitude that judges exhibit for the plaintiffs.170 Prior 
failure also may have discouraged subsequent attempts to invoke 
Rule 11. For example, environmental defendants could well have 
concluded that employing the Rule was fruitless, given the few 
sanctions motions that courts granted and the small amounts 
judges awarded after 1983.171 This situation probably enhanced 
the already substantial appeal of several relatively efficacious 
alternatives to Rule 11.172 All of these considerations seemingly 
have reduced the incentives of private defendants to seek sanc-
tions and may explain the low incidence of Rule 11 activity. 
(3). Civil Rights Defendants and Attorneys Contrasted 
Much stated in the previous subsection apparently applies to 
an insignificant number of civil rights defendants and their law-
yers. The ideas probably pertain, for example, when plaintiffs 
sue departments of the federal government for employment dis-
crimination.178 Many attorneys in the DOj Civil Division will be 
equally familiar with defending the government, and be nearly 
as detached from their clients, as numerous lawyers in the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division. 
Different factors, however, help to explain the high rate at 
which many institutional defendants and their counsel invoke 
Rule 11 in civil rights actions. States or localities have recently 
become the defendants in considerable civil rights litigation against 
the government.174 A number of these governmental units were 
170. See supra notes 25-54, 147-50 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 31-57 and accompanying text. 
172. See infra notes 239-57 and accompanying text. 
173. Examples of this litigation are Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462 ID.C. Cir. 1985) and 
Perez v. FBI, 707 F. Supp. 891 (W .D. Tex. 1988). But see Blue v. United States Dep't of the 
Army, 914 F .2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) Clargest employment discrimination class action litigation 
ever filed against Army in which government recovered substantial Rule 11 sanctions), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F .2d 
1080 (3d Cir. 1988) (involving single plaintiff civil rights action in which government recovered 
Rule 11 sanctions). 
174. For recent examples of cases in which courts rejected Rule 11 motions that local 
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previously sued rather infrequently and traditionally possessed 
and allocated relatively few resources for litigating, much less 
for paying judgments. These circumstances could have been ex-
acerbated by the significant quantity of civil rights litigation that 
alleges intentional misconduct, which means that governments 
may not be immunized from suit or be covered by insurance.175 
Moreover, the attorneys for many of the entities are compara-
tively unaccustomed to handling the cases and identify rather 
closely with their clients, for whom they often serve as employ-
ees. Furthermore, many lawsuits name local governmental offi-
cials, such as police officers or elected officials, individually as 
defendants and charge them with participating in deliberate 
wrongdoing, such as racial or gender discrimination.176 These 
factors, especially the emotionally and politically charged nature 
of the assertions that plaintiffs lodge and must prove, increase 
the likelihood that judges or defendants will invoke Rule 11 and 
may leave plaintiffs vulnerable to sanctions.177 
2. Environmental Litigation and Civil Rights Litigation 
a. Environmental Litigation 
Certain inherent characteristics of most environmental litiga-
tion help to explain why there has been so little Rule 11 activity 
in the cases. Much environmental law actually or apparently is 
complex and dynamic, involving substantial, convoluted statutory 
governmental entities filed, see Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 
1991); Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Tutton v. Garland 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Tex. 1990). See generally RoBERT H. FREILICH & 
RICHARD G. CARLISLE, SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD (1983) (analyzing state and local 
liability under civil rights statutes). 
175. See RoBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW §§ 5.3(£), 5.4(d) (1988) 
(noting that losses caused intentionally by insured not covered by liability insurance); 
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION §§ 8.06, 8.12 (Supp. 1990) 
(discussing immunity defense and intentional misconduct); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 895B, C (1979) (restating law of state and local government immunity); WILLIAM 
L. PROSSER & w. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) 
(same). 
176. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that civil rights plaintiff may 
not recover attorney's fees from a state if a state employee, individually, is the losing 
party); Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F .2d 305, 308 (11th Cir. 1989) (suing school officials in 
individual capacities). 
177. For recent examples of cases in which courts granted Rule 11 motions filed by state 
or local governmental entities, see In re Kunstler, 914 F .2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Cochran v. Ernst & Young, 758 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D. Mich. 1991); 
Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
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schemes.178 The legal theories that underlie numerous environ-
mental lawsuits correspondingly seem complicated or nontradi-
tional. 
The Supreme Court is partially responsible for these conditions, 
especially the complicated, rapidly changing appearance of the 
environmental field. The Court infrequently addresses environ-
mental issues and may not even interpret a major environmental 
statute during any specific Term.179 When the Supreme Court 
considers environmental questions, it may speak in ways that 
are not dispositive and that leave open the applicability of en-
vironmental law in numerous doctrinal areas.180 The Court's lim-
ited treatment of environmental law means that much of the field 
has been in flux and that the lower federal courts have assumed 
primary responsibility for developing considerable environmental 
law, although they have done so inconsistently.181 
A number of environmental cases, particularly challenges to 
administrative agency action, predominantly involve legal issues, 
such as statutory interpretation.182 Many of the questions impli-
178. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., Vol. 111 S. Ct. (no cases interpreting major environmental statute); Vol. 
110 S. Ct. (no cases interpreting Clean Water Act or National Environmental Policy Act); 
Vol. 108 S. Ct. (only one case interpreting a major environmental statute-the Clean Water 
Act); cf. RoDGERS, supra note 82, § 4.6, at 91 (noting that with .one or two notable exceptions, 
Supreme Court members are disinterested in or uninformed about water pollution). The 
Court's recent willingness to impose hypertechnical procedural requirements on plaintiffs 
pursuing a public lands case may evince the Court's heightened interest in the underlying 
substance of environmental law. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990); 
see also supra note 162. 
180. See, e.g., Lujan, 110 S. Ct. 3177; Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). See generally supra note 121 (stating that the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Gwaltney triggered significant litigation over timing issues under the 
Clean Water Act). 
181. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2528, 2531 & n.1 (1990) 
(granting certiorari because of disagreement among circuits on Clean Air Act interpretation); 
Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058, 1060 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(urging that the Court should grant certiorari because "lower courts have long been in 
disarray on what standard of review to apply to -an agency's decision not to undertake an" 
environmental impact statement under NEPA); cf. General Elec. v. Litton Indus. Automation 
Sys., 920 F .2d 1415, 1422 n.10 (8th Cir. 1990) (split in district courts over whether private 
party can recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing cost-recovery action under 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. S 9607(aX4XBl (1988)), cert. den:ied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991). This inconsis-
tency is not surprising with 12 circuits interpreting complex issues that arise under 
convoluted statutes and with the Supreme Court unable to resolve all of the inconsistencies. 
See generaJJ,y SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S RoLE: 
A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PRoCESS 52-59 (1986) (proposing criteria for 
selecting cases in order to harmonize conflicts among federal circuits). 
182. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 883 F .2d 1073 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 
1989). 
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cated have not been definitively resolved or at least remain 
sufficiently unclear that a broad spectrum of legal arguments 
regarding them will seem plausible. These factors have compli-
cated the efforts of environmental defendants to convince judges 
that plaintiffs pursued frivolous legal theories or failed to perform 
reasonable prefiling legal inquiries and, thus, violated Rule 11. 
In some environmental cases, the factual issues are inconse-
quential or clear-having been documented in an administrative 
record, an agency's files, or a discharger's pollution reports-
while much information necessary to satisfy Rule 11 is easily 
assembled or is accessible to environmental plaintiffs who can 
afford to collect and analyze the data. For example, one form of 
citizen suit which is principally pursued under the Clean Water 
Act proceeds against regulated interests for violations of permit 
conditions, is premised on noncompliance reports that the dis-
chargers submit to EPA, and is fairly described as "summary 
judgment material."183 In a number of other cases that do involve 
important, contested facts, information needed to satisfy Rule 11 
will be in defendant's exclusive control and can be secured only 
through discovery.184 
Moreover, in most environmental litigation, the judiciary has 
required little fact pleading of plaintiffs, applying the flexible, 
pragmatic pleading regime that was a keystone of the original 
1938 Federal Rules, a regime to which the Supreme Court sub-
scribed in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson.185 In numerous 
183. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 721 F. Supp. 
604, 608 (D.N.J.), ajj'd mem., 870 F .2d 652 (3d Cir.), and modified on reconsideration, 727 F. 
Supp. 876 (D.N.J. 1989); Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. P .D. Oil & Chem. 
Storage, 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1090 (D.N.J. 1986); see also Telephone Interview with Attorney 
Number 22, su:pra note 138. , 
184. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 25, 
at 497-98 (outlining this specific difficulty and basic Rule 11 and evidentiary problems in 
civil litigation). 
185. 355 U.S. 41, 4546 (1957); cf. infra note 195 and accompanying text (listing major 
categories of cases in which only minimal pleading is required); Ascon Properties v. Mobil 
Oil Co., 866 F .2d 1149, 1152-56 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring minimal pleading of plaintiff property 
owner in CERCLA suit). But see infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (observing that 
elevated pleading is required in civil rights cases). See generally Marcus, supra note 15, at 
434-45 (discussing pre- and post-1938 history of pleading); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 983-84 (1987) (same). The Court's recent willingness to impose hyper-
technical procedural requirements on plaintiffs pursuing a public lands case may be a sign 
that the Court would reconsider flexible pleading. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 
S. Ct. 3177 (1990); cf. Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892 ID. Mass. 1991) 
(extending specificity of pleading requirements to CERCLA cases); Supporters to Oppose 
Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (holding that complaint 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 467 
remaining environmental lawsuits, plaintiffs have comprehen-
sively pled the facts.186 These considerations have made it difficult 
for environmental defendants to persuade courts that plaintiffs 
conducted deficient prefiling investigations into the facts or that 
their papers were not well-grounded factually and, therefore, 
contravened the Rule. 
Additional intrinsic characteristics of environmental litigation, 
pertaining both to prefiling legal inquiries and to factual inves-
tigations, explain the dearth of Rule 11 activity in the suits. In 
nearly all environmental cases, there are numerous alternatives 
to the Rule, such as resolution on the merits, the application of 
which can be superior.187 The invocation of these options, partic-
ularly if successful, concomitantly complicates and even precludes 
use of Rule 11.188 Many environmental lawsuits are so complex, 
contested, or close that parties have no colorable argument for 
the Rule's violation.189 
In much environmental litigation, the character of a plaintifrs 
accusations, of the remedy sought, of the means of attaining relief 
and of the judicial role are rather noncontroversial,190 which can 
be ascribed partly to the relatively low cost for defendants of 
implementing the relief and of the litigation itself and to the 
rather apolitical nature of the cases.191 For example, suits against 
must include allegations respecting all material elements of all claims asserted; bare legal 
conclusions attached to narrated facts are insufficient); Bradley Indus. Park v. Xerox Corp., 
No. 88 Civ. 7574(CSHI, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1492, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1991) (declaring 
it insufficient for notice pleading simply to track statutory language in conclusory fashion); 
Cook v. Rockwell Int1 Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1475 (D. ·colo. 1991) (same). 
186. See supra. notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
187. See infra. notes 239-57 and accompanying text. 
188. For example, it would be disingenuous for a defendant, who vigorously argued that 
certain medical questions were so unclear that a physician should be precluded from offering 
an opinion on them and that a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case as to them before 
proceeding, to then assert that the issues were so clear that the plaintiff should not have 
filed papers and thus violated Rule 11. See infra. notes 242-43, 251 and accompanying text. 
189. See, e.g., supra notes 178-81, infra note 197 and accompanying text (complex, close 
legally); infra note 225 and accompanying text (complex, abstruse factually, legally, and 
scientifically). 
190. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976) (exemplifying classic treatment of judicial role in public law litigation). See 
generally Resnik, supra note 13 (analyzing new judicial role in case management as a means 
of controlling increasing caseloads). 
191. The costs of implementation are relatively low for government defendants who 
essentially "pass through" the expense to regulated interests. The United States Treasury 
absorbs the government's litigation costs. Cf. infra. notes 222-26 and accompanying text 
(apolitical natureh supra notes 131-32, 162-65 and accompanying text (government as envi-
ronmental plaintiff and defendant). Government plaintiffs rarely have attempted to recover 
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the government typically allege that agencies, as institutional 
bureaucracies, missed statutory deadlines for promulgating pol-
lution control regulations or inadequately enforced existing ad-
ministrative rules, ask that agencies satisfy their obligations 
within a certain time, and request that courts place the govern-
ment on compliance schedules.192 Because these constituents of 
environmental disputes are comparatively noncontroversial, de-
fendants have little vested interest in the litigation or concomi-
tant incentive to seek sanctions. 
In some environmental actions, time pressures, which are cre-
ated by the need for temporary relief to prevent imminent 
environmental injury and by short statutory deadlines for filing 
suit, can make plaintiffs' prefiling inquiries or the papers that 
they submit appear deficient.193 A few courts have considered 
this acute lack of time relevant to plaintiffs' compliance with 
Rule 11.194 
Certain characteristics examined already and others inhere in 
significant, specific types of environmental cases. In one impor-
tant category of litigation involving challenges to considerable 
agency decisionmaking, such as EPA rulemaking under the Clean 
Water Act, Congress has expressly provided for plaintiffs to file 
terse review petitions with the circuit courts.195 Because Congress 
has demanded so little of the papers that plaintiffs tender, de-
fendants can hardly require more, and virtually no defendants 
have sought Rule 11 sanctions from such plaintiffs.196 
or actually recovered attorneys' fees that they have incurred in environmental litigation. 
See, e.g., United States v. MN Zoe Colocotroni, 602 F .2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1979) (denying 
attorneys fees to government in oil spill case). Some courts have stated that government 
plaintiffs can recover attorneys' fees under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 
750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W .D. Okla. 1990); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 630· 
31 (D.N.H. 1988); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (W.D. 
Mich. 1988), aff'd sub nom. United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F .2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied. 110 S. Ct. 1527 (1990). But cf. supra note 161 (Executive Order instructing 
government counsel to seek sanctions when proper). 
192. See, e.g., supra note 183 and accompanying text; supra notes 120, 150. 
193. See, e.g., Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F .2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990) (involving 
threat of imminent injury); see also supra notes 60-63, 80-81 and accompanying text. 
194. See, e.g., Purslow, 907 F .2d at 268-69; see also supra note 61. 
195. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369lbXll (1988); acrord Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(b)(1) (1988). See generally 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
§ 1.05[2][c] (1990) (describing statutory review of administrative agency actions); 16 CHARLES 
A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRoCEDURE §§ 3940-44 (1977 & Supp. 1991) 
(discussing administrative review proceedings in a wide range of cases). 
196. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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A second major classification consists of citizen suits alleging 
that the government failed to comply with a clear, mandatory 
duty, or a debatable responsibility, that Congress imposed in 
environmental legislation.197 The obligations, which plaintiffs at 
least can contend are arguable under the statutes, frustrate 
attempts of defense counsel to show that the papers that plaintiffs 
filed lacked legal or factual support or were not preceded by 
adequate inquiries. 
Even in the particular categories of environmental cases that 
are more controversial, some intrinsic characteristics help to 
explain why there have been more threats to invoke Rule 11 
than have materialized into formal action. First, in the group of 
Clean Water Act citizen suits whose resolution is less clear than 
those described earlier,198 parties and attorneys have employed 
the Rule primarily for tactical, not substantive, purposes.199 
Second, many CERCLA cases settle, which means that most 
Rule 11 activity "washes out."200 In a number of CERCLA actions 
that do not settle, the minimal nature of certain jurisdictional 
requisites-particularly the requirements for making potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs) of entities that were not initially 
implicated in creating or disposing of hazardous wastes-has 
severely limited Rule ll's formal use.201 
Third, in much toxic tort litigation, several characteristics of 
pleading practice may have restricted reliance on Rule 11. The 
quantity of legal, technical, and scientific material that many 
plaintiffs secure before filing and their tendency to plead com-
prehensive factual allegations and traditional legal theories out 
of concern about Rule 11 mean that plaintiffs' prefiling inquiries 
and papers will appear to comply with the provision.202 The 
"boilerplate denials, lack of substantive information and laundry 
list of defenses" that counsel for defendants include in answers 
197. The classic example is agency failure to comply with a congressionally imposed 
deadline for issuing regulations. See supra note 150; supra text following note 191; cf. supra 
note 183 and accompanying text (another form of straightforward citizen suit). 
198. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (describing such citizen suits); supra notes 
116-22 (discussing suits whose disposition is less clear). 
199. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
201. "If the government can make people PRPs on the basis of almost nothing, it is hard 
to" impose more rigorous requirements on other litigants. Telephone Interview with Attor-
ney Number 17, supra note 106. 
202. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text. 
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probably have made them reluctant to invoke Rule 11, lest their 
opponents pursue counter-motions.203 
In the specific classes of actions treated and in much additional 
environmental litigation, when plaintiffs file suit, the infractions 
of the defendants are clear, a circumstance that is partly attrib-
utable to the care with which many plaintiffs select cases, conduct 
prefiling inquiries, and draft papers. These and numerous other 
considerations above mean that relatively few environmental 
actions will seem frivolous and that the suits comprise a small 
percentage of the federal docket, so that the cases apparently 
contribute minimally to the perceived litigation explosion. Thus, 
insofattJ as Rule 11 has been employed as a mechanism for com-
batting that explosion, courts have had little need to invoke the 
provision in environmental suits. All of these factors seem re-
sponsible for the dearth of Rule 11 activity in environmental 
litigation. 204 
b. Civil Rights Litigation Contrasted 
In . contrast, some inherent characteristics of civil rights liti-
gation may explain why so much Rule 11 activity has arisen in 
these lawsuits. The cases often assert unpopular or novel legal 
theories that are premised on complex, vague statutes or on 
open-ended constitutional terms, such as "due process" and "equal 
protection. "205 
The Supreme Court has treated substantive civil rights law in 
ways that appear definitive and that narrow its applicability in 
203. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 21, supra note 132; see also PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT, supra note 2, at 2 (setting forth proposed Rule ll(b), which expressly subjects 
defendants' papers to Rule's requirements). 
204. The absence of these inherent characteristics may help to explain the rather high 
incidence of Rule 11 activity in types of cases not defined as "environmental litigation" in 
this Article and, thus, lend support to the ideas here. For example, in litigation between 
companies and insurers involving the disposal and cleanup of toxic materials, the unclear, 
controversial, sharply contested character of the allegations asserted, the substantial amount 
of money at stake, and the great expense of litigating the cases may explain the elevated 
level of sanctions motions filed. Compare these ideas with those supra note 191 and 
accompanying text. See generally supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (defining "envi-
ronmental litigation"). 
Even in litigation involving private defendants, some considerations similar to those in 
the remainder of this subsection apply. For example, plaintiffs' allegations usually are lodged 
against corporations as institutions, and plaintiffs ask judges to place defendants on 
compliance schedules. Different considerations, however, do obtain in a number of suits. 
See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F .2d 
64, 80 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding $4,205,000 penalty could be appropriate for Clean Water Act 
violation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991). 
205. See BURBANK, supra note 10, at 68-72. 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 471 
many doctrinal areas.206 This evolution in the civil rights field 
probably has led numerous appellate and district judges to con-
sider much of the law as clear or static.207 These factors have 
made it relatively easy for civil rights defendants to persuade 
courts that plaintiffs were pursuing frivolous legal theories or 
had not conducted reasonable prefiling legal inquiries and had, 
therefore, contravened Rule 11. 
In many civil rights lawsuits, the factual issues are very 
important or sharply contested, while much information necessary 
to satisfy Rule 11 is difficult to secure or is in the minds or files 
of defendants and, thus, is available only upon discovery. Even 
when data needed for Rule 11 compliance are more accessible, 
the material may be expensive to gather and evaluate. A number 
of civil rights cases "test the limits" factually, involve information 
that is not documented in writing, and can unravel factually.208 
These difficulties are compounded by the rigorous pleading 
regime that every circuit has now instituted for civil rights 
litigation.209 The requirement that plaintiffs plead with specificity· 
demands more of the complaints that litigants file and, thus, can 
make plaintiffs' pleadings and their prefiling inquiries seem in-
206. Many Supreme Court rulings of the 1988 Term involving substance, procedure, and 
litigation financing epitomize these developments. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
(1989) (allowing challenge by white firefighters to hiring and promotion practices designed 
to integrate force); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring 
plaintiffs to show direct link between statistical evidence and job discrimination claims 
before suit can proceed on remand). Congress modified most of these rulings with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 10~166, SS 105, 10~. 138 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNAl 5-8 to 5-9 
(1991). See also infra note 209 and accompanying text (demonstrating that all federal circuits 
now impose stringent pleading requirements on civil rights plaintiffs). See genera.lly Steven 
R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutnry Interpremtion, 62 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 37 (1991) (arguing that the Court constricts legislative intent in its civil rights holdings); 
Cassandra Butts et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: 
The 1988 Supr({Tl!e Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARv. C.R.·C.L. L. REV. 
475 (1990) (criticizing the Court for restricting the ability to pursue civil rights suits); supra 
note 158 and accompanying text (stating that the Court made it more difficult for civil 
rights laWYers to recover attorneys' fees). 
207. Courts so treat civil rights law, although it arguably resembles environmental law 
in many respects. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
208. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 25, at 495-98; see also infra note 219. 
209. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F .2d 1, 29-31 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. den:ied. 470 U.S. 1084 
(1985); (LCC()Td Elliott v. Perez, 751 F .2d 1472, 1479-81 (5th Cir. 1985). A more recent example 
is Arnold v. Board of Education, 880 F .2d 305, 309-10 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule 8 
is applied more strictly in S 1983 cases). See genera.lly Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. 
Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991) (extending specific pleading requirements to CERCLA cases); 
Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivof.ous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in 
Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990) (arguing that a rigorous standard 
of pleading in civil rights actions is unnecessary and unjustifiable). 
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adequate.210 These considerations have simplified the efforts of 
civil rights defendants to show that plaintiffs submitted papers 
that were not well grounded in fact or failed to undertake 
reasonable factual investigations before filing and, therefore, vi-
olated the Rule. 
Other intrinsic characteristics ·of civil rights lawsuits that per-
tain to prefiling legal inquiries and factual investigations may 
explain the high level of Rule 11 activity in those cases. Civil 
rights litigation is a capacious category of suits which spans a 
broad spectrum.211 The litigation includes cases of individuals who 
pursue monetary damages for workplace discrimination and class 
action suits with thousands of parties and hundreds of issues 
that seek fundamental reform of massive bureaucracies, such as 
schools and prisons.212 
Correspondingly, some actions denominated civil rights cases 
are only nominally civil rights suits or should not even be so 
classified, because counsel who file them merely append a civil 
rights count to a claim that essentially involves another substan-
tive area.213 These civil rights counts can seem less well consid-
ered, while characterization of the cases as civil rights actions 
may have artificially inflated the number of civil rights lawsuits· 
in which Rule 11 activity has .occurred.214 
210. The rigorous pleading regime, thus, twice disadvantages civil rights plaintiffs. It 
complicates their efforts to reach the merits and makes them more vulnerable to Rule 11 
sanctions. See generally Tobias, supra note 13, at 304-08. 
211. See BURBANK, supra note 10, at 69-70; CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 1, 131 F .R.D. 
at 345. 
212. See Tobias, supra note 13, at 279-82 (giving case examples and discussing the 
litigation); see also Blaze, supra note 209, at 936-40 (analyzing litigation, especially as part 
of federal docketh cf. FlNAL REPORT, supra note 3, § lC, at 2 (reporting that civil rights 
cases represented approximately 10% of civil docket on average in five districts surveyed). 
213. See Marcus, supra note 15, at 463. Indeed, even environmental plaintiffs pied civil 
rights counts, especially prior to the advent of the major regulatory statutes. See, e.g., 
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1981h 
Garcia v. Cecos Int'l Inc., 761 F .2d 76, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1985). See generally YANNACONE ET 
AL., supra note 80, § 6:4. 
214. At the Rule 11 public hearing held during February, 1991, several members of the 
Advisory Committee were concerned about the amount of Rule 11 activity in civil rights 
cases and asked the Federal Judicial Center to refine its recently collected data on the 
cases. Telephone Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal 
Judicial Center CFeb. 26, 1991). Analysis of the case files for all civil rights actions in which 
courts imposed sanctions in the five pertinent districts showed that plaintiffs' Rule 11 
violations consisted principally of deficient preffiing legal inquiries, occasionally of inadequate 
factual investigations, but rarely of papers filed for improper purposes. Moreover, judges 
sanctioned few represented plaintiffs over the relevant three year period. Few of the cases 
presented good faith arguments for change in the law or were the "Br()UJ71, v. Board of 
Education or Gide<m v. Wainwright of the nineties." Thomas Willging, Statement at Advisory 
Comm. Meeting, Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1991). 
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In much civil rights litigation, the nature of the allegations 
asserted, of the relief requested, of the means of achieving it, 
and of the court's role are extremely controversial. These effects 
are partially attributable to the comparative expense of the 
litigation and of effectuating the relief as well as the litigation's 
relatively political character. For example, in school desegrega-
tion cases, plaintiffs may accuse the local school board of racial 
discrimination, ask the judge to enter a structural decree ending 
segregation, and request that the court adopt a busing plan that 
crosses the boundaries of several localities and that requires 
active judicial oversight of the educational system for many 
years.215 
Other forms of civil rights litigation can be even more highly 
charged. In employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs may claim 
that specific managerial personnel discriminated on the basis of 
race, age, or gender when hiring and promoting employees and 
may ask that affirmative action measures be instituted to rectify 
the alleged discrimination.216 In many civil rights actions, the lack 
of a paper record, the complex, subtle, and subjective nature of 
discrimination, and the difficulty of proving bias mean that the 
suits devolve into swearing matches between plaintiffs who pas-
sionately assert that they suffered discrimination and defendants 
who fervently deny any bias. 
Civil rights cases may be the most emotional category of 
federal civil lawsuit. The actions also can implicate political issues 
that much environmental litigation simply does not. For example, 
the accusation that an individual discriminated on the basis of 
race or gender exposes the raw nerves of society in ways that 
charging a company with air pollution cannot.217 Many civil rights 
215. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 
U.S. 33 (1990). See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SwANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BuSING CASE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1986) (discussing the evolution of school desegregation cases 
during the years of the Warren and Burger Courts). 
216. See, e.g:, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). For a sense of the controversial nature of the relief sought in 
such litigation, which can last for decades and involve many classes of litigants, see United 
States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 927 F .2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. deni£d, 112 S. Ct. 70 (1991) 
and United States v. City of Chicago, 897 F .2d 243 (7th Cir. 1990). The costs of litigation 
and implementing relief can be substantial. 
217. This idea remains true even though advocates of vigorous civil rights enforcement 
have ,sustained some recent setbacks in the area of doctrinal civil rights law. See supra 
note 206 and accompanying text. See generally KrusTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 
(1988) (describing the emotion-filled personal civil rights encounters of the author's inter-
viewees and difficulties discrimination victims encounter in vindicating civil rights); Putting 
Civil Rights on Automatic Pilct, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY EDITION, Mar. 25-31, 1991, at 14. 
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disputes are bitterly fought contests over matters of principle in 
which plaintiffs seek to press the extremes of law, fact, or policy; 
to challenge entrenched political or economic interests; or to 
rectify intractable social problems through unpopular or untested 
means. 
The role of the judge in civil rights cases can be quite contro-
versial. Plaintiffs may request that the court expansively inter-
pret the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, divine 
congressional intent from terse or ambiguous statutory phrase-
ology, intercede in the political decisionmaking of local elected 
officials, or even order such officers to spend funds or face 
contempt.218 
Certain of these factors, such as the substantial emotional 
stakes and the strong motivations for invoking Rule 11, increase 
the likelihood that judges and defendants will employ Rule 11 in 
civil rights litigation. Most of the factors can make the prefiling 
legal and factual inquiries that plaintiffs perform and the papers 
that they submit look deficient, thereby enhancing the plaintiffs' 
susceptibility to sanctions. 
Despite the discrepancies between Rule 11 activity in environ-
mental cases and in civil rights actions, the similarities between 
these two types of actions are striking. For example, in both 
kinds of litigation, plaintiffs plead novel legal theories, premise 
their suits on complex, unclear statutes, litigate in areas of law 
that are complicated and fast-changing, raise delicate questions 
of federalism and judicial authority, lack access to facts important 
for Rule 11 compliance, and experience time pressures in con-
ducting prefiling inquiries. Despite these commonalities, courts 
seem to attach different, and often diametrically opposed, signif-
icance to analogous conditions in the cases. For instance, judges 
apparently consider similar, nontraditional legal theories creative 
when asserted in environmental suits but frivolous when alleged 
in civil rights actions.219 
3. The Federal Judiciary's Percey>tions 
The federal judiciary's apparently positive perceptions of, and 
solicitude for, environmental lawyers, litigants, and cases also 
218. See, e.g., Jenki,ns, 495 U.S. 33; Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 625 (1990). 
219. See supra notes 30-37, 179-82, 208-09 and accompanying text. Some judges, in applying 
Rule 11, recently have recognized certain difficulties that civil rights plaintiffs confront. 
See, e.g., Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F .2d 986, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1991); Mareno v. 
Rowe, 910 F .2d 1043, 1046-47 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. d.enWd, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); Kraemer v. 
Grant County, 892 F .2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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seem important to the paucity of Rule 11 activity in environmen-
tal suits.22° For example, many judges appear to believe that 
numerous attorneys. who represent environmental plaintiffs pos-
sess substantial expertise, and the judges often have cordial, 
continuing relations with the lawyers and their clients.221 A 
number of judges may be receptive to the individuals whom 
environmental plaintiffs purportedly represent, to the substantive 
interests that they attempt to vindicate, to the means of accom-
plishing the objectives that the plaintiffs seek, and to the ends 
themselves. 
Many judges seem to consider environmental actions as soci-
etally significant but view them differently from other cases that 
implicate social welfare or "social regulation," namely civil rights 
lawsuits.222 These perceptual distinctions may be ascribed to quite 
a few factors, such as the disparate nature of the allegations 
asserted in, and the legal theories that underlie, the litigation. 
The claim that an agency violated a regulation or even that a 
corporation harmed an endangered species is simply less incrim-
inating and discomfiting to judges than the accusation that an 
individual was convicted because of the person's race or religion. 
Correspondingly, numerous courts seem more responsive to cases 
that are grounded in clear statutory mandates than to those that 
require judicial construction of the general provisions in the 
Constitution.223 · 
Moreover, comparatively few judges will be indifferent to the 
charges of environmental degradation that are brought in many 
environmental actions, especially disputes that involve a local 
resource, such as an airshed or a river. A judge who lives in the 
community224 breathes the very air or drinks the same water and 
thus could be exposed to pollution but may never experience 
discrimination. 
Furthermore, a number of judges apparently consider many 
environmental cases to be complicated, find daunting the abstruse 
220. What is said in this subsection cannot be proved, because it speaks to perceptions 
of judges. I rely upon what judges state in their opinions and what lawyers who practice 
environmental law have said about judges, although neither source is totally reliable. 
221. See supa, notes 130, 147-52 and accompanying text. 
222. "President Bush, who claims to be the environmental President," did appoint some 
of the judges. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supa note 106; cf. William 
Lilley m & James c. Miller m, The New "Social Regul.ation", 47 PUB. INTEREST 49 (1977) 
(discussing social legislation of which environmental statutes are a quintessential example). 
223. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). 
224. See 28 U.S.C. S 134(b) (1988) (requiring each district judge, except those in the District 
of Columbia, to reside in the district or districts for which he or she is appointed). 
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factual, legal, scientific, and policy issues embedded in some suits, 
and experience tremendous difficulty handling certain complex 
aspects of the litigation.225 If courts encounter such a multitude 
of problems resolving the cases, they could well be reluctant to 
hold that attorneys and parties who pursue the actions contra-
vened Rule 11.226 
Although the propositions above cannot be proved, most of the 
ideas may be illustrated by contrasting them with many judges' 
rather negative view of, and unresponsiveness to, civil rights 
lawyers, plaintiffs, and litigation. One compelling indication is the 
dramatic statistical disparity between Rule 11 activity in civil 
rights cases and environmental suits. The federal judiciary has 
issued approximately forty times as many published Rule 11 
opinions in civil rights actions as in environmental cases.227 An-
other telling sign is that civil rights plaintiffs are more than 
twice as likely as other litigants to be sanctioned under Rule 11 
in a number of federal districts.228 
An unfavorable judicial perception of, or lack of solicitude for, 
civil rights attorneys may be evidenced by recent determinations 
that three of the country's highest profile civil rights lawyers-
Julius Chambers, William Kunstler, and Ramsey Clark-violated 
Rule 11 in unrelated, controversial civil rights cases.229 Certain 
judges apparently think that some members of the civil rights 
bar lack substantive experience, and the judges may have me-
diocre or strained relations with the attorneys and none with 
their clients.230 
225. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
226. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106. 
227. Approximately 500 civil rights cases and 14 environmental cases involving Rule 11 
have been published. See supra notes 10, 26 and accompanying text. Civil rights plaintiffs 
also are sanctioned at a higher rate than environmental plaintiffs. Campare Vairo, supra 
note 3, at 200-01 with supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text and infra note 228 and 
accompanying text. 
228. Data collected from five federal district courts with computerized docket data indicate 
that civil rights plaintiffs on the average are 2.6 times as likely to be sanctioned as other 
litigants. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, § lC. at 3. 
229. See Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (afflI'Illing 
lower court determination that Chambers violated Rule 11), cert. deni,ed, 111 S. Ct. 1580 
(1991); In re Kunstler, 914 F .2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming lower court determination that 
Kunstler violated Rule 11), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F .2d 
438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reversing lower court determination that Clark had not violated Rule 
11), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990). See generally Ruth Marcus, Rule 11: Does It Curb 
Frivokrus Lawsuits or Civil Rights Claims?, WASH. PosT, Apr. 12, 1991, at A17 (discussing 
the Chambers and Kunstler cases). 
230. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text. 
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A number of judges have been relatively unreceptive to many 
civil rights cases.231 Several members of the Supreme Court, 
which has recently narrowed much civil rights law, and numerous 
lower federal court judges appear to believe that civil rights 
actions as a category are more frivolous than other civil cases, 
including environmental litigation.232 All of the circuits have now 
relied partially on the notion that civil rights suits are less 
meritorious to demand that civil rights plaintiffs plead with 
particularity under Rule 8, although the provision's terms impose 
no such requirement233 and neither empirical data nor judicial 
authority supports more stringent pleading.234 The judicial per-
ception that civil rights actions are comparatively frivolous in 
conjunction with their constituting a significant percentage of 
the federal docket235 could lead courts to associate the cases with 
the litigation explosion, a major focus of Rule ll's 1983 amend-
ment. 
Some judges have seemed indifferent to civil rights lawsuits, 
while a few have exhibited hostility toward the actions.236 Indeed, 
the apparent insensitivity to civil rights of a recent district court 
judge nominated to the Eleventh Circuit led him to be the first 
Bush Administration nominee whom the Senate has rejected.237 
231. One example is pro se prisoner suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
232. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F .2d 646, 
649 (9th Cir. 1984); supra note 209 and accompanying text. A few judges have expressly 
stated that civil rights cases are more frivolous. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 
532 F .2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976). 
The Advisory Committee expressly required more stringent pleading only of plaintiffs 
who allege fraud under Rule 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See generally Tobias, supra note 
13, at 299 (discussing heightened pleading requirements). 
234. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F .2d 1472, 1483 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) 
(discussing lack of authority); Rotol.o, 532 F.2d at .927 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing lack of data). Numerous courts may find that Rule 11 affords 
a convenient way to discourage the pursuit of cases that judges already believed were 
disproportionately frivolous, which may reflect their substantial concern about the litigation 
explosion. 
235. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
236. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 897 F .2d 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1990); Szabo 
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F .2d 1073, 1083-85 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 
485 U.S. 901 (1988). 
237. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 1990, at Al (describing example of apparent insensitivity); TO'pics of the Times; 
Judge Ryskamp's Oum Words, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, § 4, at 18 (discussing apparent 
insensitivity and rejection). 
The concepts in the text may also be demonstrated by the federal judiciary's growing 
reluctance to enter certain forms of relief, such as structural decrees, that civil rights 
plaintiffs frequently seek. Courts seem to find increasingly controversial the means for 
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The factors examined mean that judges are rather likely to 
raise Rule 11 sua sponte and to grant defendants' sanctions 
motions in civil rights cases. Insofar as courts have formulated 
negative impressions of civil rights plaintiffs, attorneys, and 
litigation, the judges may not appreciate or consider certain 
pertinent factors. These include most importantly the resource 
deficiencies that plague many of the plaintiffs and lawyers, the 
cutting-edge nature of much civil rights litigation, and express 
congressional intent that the judiciary facilitate the plaintiffs' 
vindication of fundamental civil rights.238 
4. Alternatives to Rule 11 
The wide range and relative efficacy of alternatives to Rule 
11 that judges and environmental litigants have invoked could 
explain the dearth of Rule 11 activity in environmental cases. Of 
course, in much environmental litigation, disposition on the merits 
may be preferable. As a lawyer who pursues toxic tort actions 
cogently observed, the "goal of attorneys for plaintiffs is to get 
to the end of the case rather than fight peripheral battles," which 
are exemplified by satellite litigation involving Rule 11.239 
Many courts apparently have considered the substantive res-
olution of disputes to be the best approach. A number of judges 
have relied on numerous substitutes for Rule 11 that are as 
effecting the relief, the judicial role that implementation necessitates, and the thorny 
questions of federalism and deference to the political branches that can be implicated. For 
helpful treatment of these issues, see DoNALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(1977); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes 
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme 
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Fwms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert F. 
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equita.ble Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
661 (1978). 
238. Congressional intent is expressed in substantive, procedural, and fee-shifting legis-
lation. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1004, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988); Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The Supreme Court also has recognized 
that civil rights suits are essential to liberty. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 
(1977); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam). 
Individual judges' perceptions of Rule 11, as a valuable or worthless tool, for example, 
may be important in specific cases. Those perceptions, however, seem to have limited 
explanatory power, especially when the federal judiciary has been so willing to apply Rule 
11 in civil rights cases and so reluctant to apply it in environmental cases. Cf. FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 3, § lA, at 1 (80% of district judges favor retaining Rule 11 in present 
form, but a like number believe litigation abuse is minor problem). 
239. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 21, supra note 132; cf. supra note 168 
and accompanying text (noting desire of defense counsel in large firms to resolve litigation 
on merits). But cf. infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text (describing defense techniques 
that do not lead directly to resolution on merits). 
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effective as the Rule. These substitutes include vigorous case 
management (especially under Rule 16's requirements governing 
pretrial conferences), civil contempt, the federal provision holding 
attorneys liable for excessive costs,240 and state bar ethics re-
strictions. 241 
Many environmental litigants, principally defendants, have asked 
that judges employ most of these measures and certain others 
in lieu of Rule 11. One favored technique, which defense counsel 
increasingly encourage federal courts to apply, is the Lone Pine 
doctrine, named for the case in which a New Jersey state trial 
judge originally articulated the concept.242 Lawyers for defen-
dants essentially seize on any perceived vulnerability in a plain-
tiffs case, typically involving causal links or unsettled scientific 
questions, and request that the court discontinue discovery in 
the litigation until the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing on 
the disputed point.243 
Defendants in environmental actions have employed several 
other mechanisms that can fairly be characterized as countersuits 
and that are intended primarily to discourage the vigorous pur-
suit of environmental cases. The most notorious, and widely used, 
alternative is Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation 
(SLAPP) suits.244 These cases seek substantial damages from 
environmental plaintiffs for commencing or participating in ad-
240. 28 u.s.c. s 1927 (1988). 
241. See, e.g., Northside Sanitary Landfill v. City of Indianapolis, 902 F .2d 521, 523 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (applying 28 U.S.C. S 1927); Polger v. Republic Nat'l Banlc, 709 F. Supp. 204, 212 
n.1 (D. Colo. 1989) (same); Can Am Indus. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 631 F. Supp. 
1180, 1188 (C.D. m. 1986) (applying 28 U.S.C. S 1927 and Rule 65). See generally Carl Tobias, 
Jud:icial Discretion and th£ 1989 Amendments to th£ Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 
933, 944-46, 948-50 (1991) (discussing use of Rule 16, inherent judicial authority, and informal 
threats as Rule 11 substitutes); Vairo, supra note 3, at 233 (arguing for use of § 1927 and 
other informal means). 
242. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L 33606-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986) 
(LEXIS, States library, NJ file). 
243. Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 15, supra note 106 and Number 21, 
supra note 132. 
244. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1991). 
For descriptions of the suits, see Joseph Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation 
Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105 (1988); Penelope Canan & George W. 
Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mizi.ng Quantitative and 
Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Sec'y REV. 385 (1988); Eve Pell, SLAPPed Silly, CAL. 
LAW., Feb.1990, at 24. Professor George Pring, who received a National Science Foundation 
grant to study SLAPP suits, observed that they have been employed in "hundreds of the 
cases, only ten percent of which have been reported"; that environmental defendants prefer 
the suits to Rule 11 because they threaten plaintiffs with greater exposure to liability; and 
that the litigation typically is brought by local or regional entities. Telephone Interview 
with Professor George Pring, Denver University College of Law (Mar. 19, 1991). 
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ministrative proceedings or courtroom litigation.245 A second at-
torney involved in many toxic tort actions stated that SLAPP 
suits "scare victims who have been exposed to toxic materials to 
death" and that his "clients are absolutely freaked out by the 
cases."246 Litigation under the Racketeering Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO) is another form of countersuit to 
which defense counsel resort, though less frequently.247 
Numerous reasons justify courts', lawyers', and parties' reli-
ance on alternatives to Rule 11. Judges and plaintiffs may have 
preferred certain options, such as merits-disposition and vigorous 
case management, because the alternatives achieve Rule ll's 
primary purpose of deterring litigation abuse as effectively as 
the Rule while minimizing the Rule's principal disadvantages-
limiting federal court access, chilling legitimate lawsuits, eroding 
civility among judges, attorneys and parties, and spawning sat-
ellite litigation.248 Public interest litigants apparently appreciate 
that Rule 11 as written intrinsically favors defendants and, thus, 
is rather ineffective. For example, the limited time that the 
Federal Rules afford defendants to file answers makes those 
responses less vulnerable to sanctions motions.249 
Some environmental defendants and defense counsel may have 
different perspectives on Rule ll's purposes and diverse views 
of efficacy as it relates to the invocation of alternatives. For 
instance, Rule ll's compensatory objective may appear significant 
to a defe.ndant who has incurred substantial costs in successfully 
resisting charges that it damaged the air or water and wishes 
to recover those expenses. 
245. See Canan & Pring, supra note 244; Pell, supa note 244; Telephone Interview with 
Professor George Pring, supra note 244. 
246. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106. 
247. An asbestos manufacturer pursued the leading case against tire workers who 
allegedly were injured by exposure to asbestos and who had settled their claims with the 
manufacturer. See Raymark Indus. v. Stemple, 714 F. Supp. 460, 468-76 CD. Kan. 1988); see 
also In re Tire Workers Asbestos Litig., 125 F .R.D. 617 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (discussing charges 
of fraud against tire workers). See generally Al Buchanan, Note, Evolving RICO Issues for 
the Enmr®rrumta/JNaturol Resources Practitioner, 6 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 185 (1990-91) 
(discussing the application of RICO to environmental cases). 
248. See supra notes 161-65, 239-41 and accompanying text; cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (discussing Rule ll's purposes and disadvantages); William 
W. Schwarzer, Rule 11Revisited,101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988) (same). 
249. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(a) (defendants generally have 20 days to answer); see also 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 2, at 2 (setting fqrth proposed Rule ll(b), which expressly 
subjects defendants' papers to Rule's requirements). 
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Correspondingly, defense counsel who want to limit similar 
costs from the outset of litigation primarily by restricting an 
action's scope will consider the Lone Pine doctrine250 more effec-
tive than Rule 11. Lone Pine motions can reduce defendants' 
expenditures, particularly on discovery, by suspending much pre-
trial activity in suits and immersing them in complex medical 
and scientific questions, while requiring that plaintiffs spend large 
sums to have expert witnesses conduct complicated analytical 
research and encouraging the litigants to settle.251 An important 
incentive for defendants to exercise this and other options is that 
they deflect attention from the substance of environmental dis-
putes, thereby permitting defendants to evade responsibility for 
pollution. 
SLAPP suits afford another telling example. The principal 
reason why many environmental defendants pursue these actions 
is to expose environmental plaintiffs to "liability which is orders 
of magnitude larger than Rule 11" and defendants, therefore, 
substantially increase the potential for chilling the plaintiffs and 
for restricting federal court access.252 
Several theories explain why the appeal of, and reliance on, 
SLAPP suits and other alternatives have increased since Rule 
ll's amendment in 1983. Defense counsel had little initial success 
either in persuading courts that plaintiffs had contravened the 
provision or in convincing judges to impose substantial sanctions 
on plaintiffs found in violation.253 This refusal to award large 
assessments and judicial recognition that deterrence, not com-
pensation, is the Rule's primary purpose rendered it ineffective 
as a mechanism for recouping litigation expenses and for dis-
couraging environmental litigation.254 
250. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text. 
251. See Telephone Interviews with Attorneys Number 15, supra note 106; Number 21, 
supra note 132; cf. supa note 188 (arguing that such tactics may preclude the use of Rule 
11). 
252. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supra note 106; accord Telephone 
Interview with Professor George Pring, supa note 244. 
253. See supa notes 31-57 and accompanying text; Telephone Interview with Attorney 
Number 15, supra note 106 ("jurisprudence of Rule 11 in environmental cases" never 
developed because initial lack of success discouraged defense counsel who resorted to other 
mechanisms); Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 23 (Apr. 11, 1991) <same). 
254. None of the attorneys for public interest litigants whom I interviewed believed that 
Rule 11 discouraged their organizations from litigating. Cf. supa note 246 and accompanying 
text (indicating that SLAPPs discourage individuals who consider pursuing toxic tort 
litigation); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990) (providing 
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Related peculiarities of litigation financing also explain why 
environmental litigants have invoked alternatives to Rule 11. 
Public interest litigants can secure attorneys' fees under most 
environmental statutes when they prevail and thus have little 
reason to employ the Rule for compensatory objectives.255 Gov-
ernmental plaintiffs and defendants may be relatively uncon-
cerned about recovering litigation costs,256 while some private 
defendants may prefer absorbing those expenses to running the 
risks entailed in seeking to recoup them from plaintiffs.257 
B. Lessons 
1. Rul,e 11's Advantages and Disadvantages 
This analysis of Rule 11 activity in environmental lawsuits 
supports tentative assessments of the benefits and disadvantages 
of the provision's implementation. Rule 11 may encourage certain 
environmental plaintiffs and their counsel to "stop and think" 
before filing court papers. The Rule, therefore, could limit some-
what the quantity of frivolous papers submitted and the amount 
of litigation abuse in environmental cases.258 Both amounts ap-
parently had been small, however, when Rule 11 was amended 
in 1983, and the subsequent dearth may be attributable to factors 
already examined, such as the incentives that motivate environ-
mental plaintiffs to conduct prefiling inquiries and to file papers 
that seem to satisfy the Rule.259 
The relative lack of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation 
and courts' reluctance to sanction, and solicitude for, environ-
mental plaintiffs and lawyers suggest that the Rule has not chilled 
judicial recognition that deterrence, not compensation, is Rule ll's primary purpose); supro, 
notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing courts' refusal to award large sanctions 
against environmental plaintiffs). See generally surra notes 171-72 and accompanying text 
(discussing abuse of discretion standard for Rule 11 decisions). 
255. See surra notes 82, 144 and accompanying text; cf. su:pra note 248 and accompanying 
text (noting that plaintiffs may be loath to invoke Rule 11 because of its potential to limit 
federal court access and to chill legitimate litigation). 
256. See surra note 191. 
257. See surra notes 166-72 and accompanying text; surra note 204. 
258. I am not implying that the quantity of either has been large. Cf. Schwarzer, surra 
note 248, at 1014-15 (asserting that Rule 11 generally has caused attorneys to stop and 
think and has deterred some frivolous litigation). 
259. See surra notes 13546 and accompanying text: cf. Glaser v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 
808 F .2d 285 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing $165,000 attorney fee award under pre-1983 version 
of Rule 11 to 89 benzene manufacturers who were dismissed from the action because 
plaintiffs' prefiling investigation was not so deficient as to constitute subjective bad faith). 
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parties and attorneys who pursue most kinds of environmental 
actions.260 Correspondingly, application of Rule 11 in ways that 
disadvantaged plaintiffs has been more ubiquitous in civil rights 
suits than in certain types of public law cases and may not even 
be occurring in other forms of that litigation. The infrequent 
invocation of Rule 11 in environmental actions probably means 
that many judges, litigants, and lawyers involved in the suits 
have experienced neither the loss of civility nor the increase in 
satellite litigation that Rule 11 has provoked in other types of 
cases.261 
These "benefits" should be qualified, and some advantages 
actually could be detriments. Most significantly, the ideas are 
premised primarily on formal Rule 11 activity, which has appar-
ently disadvantaged public interest litigants, including environ-
mental plaintiffs, less than informal activity.262 Informal Rule 11 
activity, thus, may be dampening the enthusiasm of numerous 
environmental plaintiffs and attorneys, especially those who bring 
more controversial environmental actions, such as toxic tort suits. 
Encouraging environmental plaintiffs and lawyers to "stop and 
think" before filing may not be an unqualified benefit and might 
have deleterious side effects. For example, it increases the "front-
end" costs of litigation, expenses that apparently cannot be 
recouped, and imposes them on parties and attorneys, a number 
of whom have limited ability to bear the costs.263 Indeed, threats 
to employ Rule 11 in toxic tort cases have "made counsel for 
plaintiffs so paranoid that they cling to precedent and plead 
traditional theories," thereby discouraging innovation in an oth-
erwise dynamic area of environmental law.264 
These and related concerns, such as the possible need to spend 
large sums participating in unnecessary satellite litigation or 
260. See supa note 253; cf. infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (discussing chilling 
effect of informal Rule 11 activity). 
261. These disadvantages and those enumerated above in note 248 and the accompanying 
text are ones that have been especially problematic in civil rights cases. See Tobias, supa 
note 167, at 163-64; see cdso lNTERIM REPORT OF THE COMM. ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 20 (1991) (describing Rule 11 sanctions as "incivility flash point"). 
262. This informal activity has especially disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs. See Tobias, 
supra note 25, at 501-02. 
263. See SU]Yf(], notes 70-74 and accompanying text (recounting instance in which expenses 
could not be recoupeg~ Tobias, supa note 25, at 495-98 (discussing front-end costs and 
persons with limited ability to bear). 
264. Telephone Interview with Attorney Number 15, supa note 106. The attorney was 
alluding to the propensity of plaintiffs' counsel to plead "duty to warn" in accord with the 
early leading precedent of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products, 493 F .2d 1076 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denid, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
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appealing trial court imposition of sanctions, could dissuade en-
vironmental plaintiffs and lawyers from commencing, or zealously 
pursuing, legitimate actions. This effect is especially true of suits 
that advocate novel or creative legal theories; involve voluminous, 
unclear or sharply contested facts; are close legally, scientifically, 
or factually; raise controversial issues; or are expensive to liti-
gate.265 For example, in the recent First Circuit case in which 
two respected members of the Maine bar appealed a Rule 11 
sanction of $250 levied by the district judge,266 the attorneys 
probably spent thousands of dollars to contest the decision. They 
apparently did so as a "matter ol principle" and to protect their 
reputations, even though the First Circuit found that the lower 
court had not abused its discretion in what the appellate panel 
acknowledged was a close case.267 
Numerous "advantages" described above are attributable to 
the low incidence of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation. 
Some of the comparative inactivity can be ascribed to the in-
formed judgments of many environmental defendants and defense 
counsel that Rule 11 is a rather ineffective mechanism for achiev-
ing their purposes. Certain of the objectives correspondingly may 
have questionable validity. These include discouraging environ-
mental plaintiffs and lawyers from instituting and vigorously 
pursuing environmental actions, imposing substantial litigation 
costs on the parties and attorneys, and diverting the focus of 
lawsuits from the merits to extraneous matters, thus avoiding 
responsibility for environmental degradation. 
2. Study of Rule 11 
The assessment of Rule 11 activity in environmental litigation 
affords insights on conducting additional studies of the Rule and 
similar evaluations. The experience discloses certain difficulties 
in performing the research. For instance, relying too substantially 
on reported judicial opinions and even on formal activity can 
undermine accuracy because much Rule 11 activity is informal, 
265. It is impossible to discern the number of valid cases that have not been pursued 
because of these concerns. See supra note 83. 
266. Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F .2d 265 (1st Cir. 1990). 
267. See id. at 266, 269; supra note 60 and accompanying text; cf. Golden Eagle Distrib. 
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F .2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing another example of large 
expenditures to litigate a matter of principle). The result in Pursk>w is particularly troubling 
because considerable environmental litigation that is not undertaken by institutional plain-
tiffs is performed by lawyers on a pro bono basis. 
1992] ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND RULE 11 485 
as has been much of the activity that seemingly disadvantages 
public interest litigants the most.268 This potential problem ap-
parently did not materialize in environmental cases, because the 
quantity and effects of both formal and informal activity seemed 
so similar. 
Speaking with attorneys who participate actively in environ-
mental disputes, however, enhances understanding of Rule 11 
and environmental litigation in ways that examining published 
judicial decisions cannot. For example, such opinions rarely enable 
readers to discern the reasons why environmental plaintiffs file 
certain cases, to comprehend the parties' ongoing relations with 
judges and other environmental litigants, or to appreciate the 
multitude of alternatives to Rule 11 and why they might have 
seemed preferable. This analysis of environmental suits thus 
emphasizes the importance of consulting sources in addition to 
published determinations.269 
Correspondingly, gathering data on informal Rule 11 activity 
may be quite expensive, because considerable relevant informa-
tion is anecdotal. Some instructive material, therefore, can be 
assembled most effectively by conducting time-consuming tele-
phone or personal interviews or by circulating carefully phrased 
questionnaires and compiling the responses.270 
This difficulty, and the study as a whole, illustrate the com-
plications of collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing applicable 
empirical data and of drawing justifiable conclusions from the 
material assembled.271 Attempting to premise credible assess-
ments on the internal dynamics of such multifaceted and byzan-
tine institutions as the federal courts and large law firms can be 
especially problematic. To designate and to accord relative re-
sponsibility to the pertinent variables that could explain why 
Rule 11 is invoked more frequently in certain forms of CERCLA 
268. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 501--03; Tobias, supra note 167, at 170 n.46; cf. BuRBANK, 
supra note 10, at 45, 59 (explaining that considerable Rule 11 activity is informal). 
269. Cf. Burbank, supra note 11, at 1939-40 (calling for law faculty to undertake empirical 
research outside of law schools). 
270. The Federal Judicial Center circulated a questionnaire to all federal district judges 
in its recent study. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, SS 2A-2C. The American Judicature 
Society recently circulated a questionnaire to lawyers in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits who had had experience with Rule 11 during the preceding year. See AMERICAN 
JUDICATURE SOCIETY RULE 11 STUDY PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1991). 
271. See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Sclwl.arship, 21 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 647, 686-91 (1988) (discussing problems entailed in treating empirical data). 
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litigation than in some kinds of NEPA cases is equally difficult.272 
The examination of Rule 11 activity in environmental lawsuits 
offers additional perspectives on this type of effort. Before un-
dertaking the evaluation, I speculated that Rule ll's application 
was affecting environmental plaintiffs and lawyers adversely, 
because substantial .Rule 11 activity has disadvantaged civil rights 
plaintiffs and attorneys. Moreover, since 1986, several writers 
and numerous public interest and civil rights lawyers have sug-
gested that Rule 11 activity in public law cases apart from civil 
rights actions might be adversely affecting public interest liti-
gants. 273 Finding that Rule 11 activity in environmental suits was 
less detrimental to plaintiffs than I had projected underscores 
the importance of maintaining a neutral, detached viewpoint and 
of formulating conclusions only after assembling and analyzing 
sufficient data.274 
The study also demonstrates the need both to differentiate 
between forms of public law litigation, even between those that 
have the number of similarities that exist between such paradig-
matic kinds of modern litigation as environmental lawsuits and 
civil rights actions,276 and to distinguish between the various 
types of environmental cases and civil rights litigation.276 Public 
law suits and environmental cases are not monolithic. 
The analysis illustrates as well the hazards of overgeneraliza-
tion. The great discrepancies between Rule 11 activity in envi-
ronmental actions and civil rights lawsuits can be ascribed to the 
different views that participants in the cases have of both types 
of litigation's purposes, of the reasons for invoking Rule 11, and 
of alternatives to it. These ideas offer the best generalized 
explanation of the disparities, but the concepts do not purport 
272. This analysis of potential variables obviously is not exhaustive. See generalJ,y tm]Yl'a 
notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing problem of defining public law litigation); 
infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing problem of distinguishing types of 
environmental cases). 
273. See, e.g., Arthur B. La France, Federal RUle 11 and Public Interest Litigatian, 22 
VAL. U. L. REV. 331 (1988); Tobias, tmpa note 167, at 170; Tobias, tmpa note 25, at 502-03 
(citing telephone interviews); Vairo, tmpa note 3, at 200-02. 
274. Professor Marcus observed that "scholarly insights sometimes lead in directions the 
scholar finds discomfiting • . . [b}ut that conclusion underscores the importance of the 
dispassionate scholar who observes and explores without a stake in a particular outcome." 
Marcus, tmpa note 271, at 694. 
275. See tmpa note 219 and accompanying text. 
276. Examples include the distinction between toxic tort litigation and other forms of 
environmental litigation. See, e.g., tmpa notes 202-03, 264 and accompanying text. See 
generaJJ,y tmpa notes 106-122, 195-201 and accompanying text (discussing differences among 
various types of environmental suits). 
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to be exhaustive or to explain specific situations. What is occur-
ring in particular circumstances will depend on the constellation 
of variables comprising them, each of which must be identified, 
isolated, and assigned relevance.277 
In sum, although most explanations for Rule 11 activity in 
environmental lawsuits inform understanding of the Rule, the 
cases, and the current legal culture in the federal courts, they 
are not dispositive. Ironically, the explanations neither defini-
tively resolve the controversy that has attended Rule ll's imple-
mentation since 1983 nor clearly indicate the best course of future 
action. Indeed, some of them even exacerbate that controversy.278 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The evaluation of Rule ll's implementation in environmental 
litigation shows that little formal or informal activity has oc-
curred. Courts have evinced solicitude for environmental plain-
tiffs, few of whom have been sanctioned. These determinations 
contrast sharply with findings derived from studying the Rule's 
application in civil rights cases. Rule 11 activity in those lawsuits 
has been highly controversial and has dampened the enthusiasm 
of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. Because the Rule has det-
rimentally affected them and other parties and attorneys while 
imposing considerable cost on the civil justice system, numerous 
observers have suggested that the provision promptly be amended, 
and those with rule-revising responsibility have recently proposed 
amendment. The disadvantages may well warrant expeditious 
revision of the Rule, even though minimal Rule 11 activity has 
been present in environmental litigation, judges have enforced 
the provision with comparative solicitude for environmental plain-
tiffs, and the study of Rule ll's implementation in environmental 
cases affords instructive insights on modern civil litigation. 
'ZT7. See Carl W. Tobias, Of Publi,c Funds and Publi,c Participati.-On: Resolving tM Issue of 
Agency AutJwriJ:y to Refrnhurse Publw Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 906, 954 (1982); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and tM Publi,c Rights Exception to Party 
Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REV. 745, 791 (1987). 
'ZTB. Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee proposed in August, 1991, that Rule 11 be 
amended. See supra note 6. 
